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The GATT and International Trade
1.0 INTRODUCTION
After four months of participant-observation at the GAIT' Head-
quarters in Geneva during the final phase of the Uruguay Round (UR), I
am most aware of the tension between the two norms of most-favored
nation (MFN) status and reciprocity2 that pervade the GATT as an in-
ternational trade agreement. MFN status is also called nondiscrimina-
tion, which embodies the practice of giving all trading partners the same
breaks on the same goods. MFN is the "play the same to everyone" rule
of the GAIT. On the other hand, reciprocity is the "give-to-get" rule,
typified by "If I give you a break on a trade barrier on this good, then
you must give me an equivalent break on the same or different good."
Reciprocity embodies the principle that altruism, giving a trade break, is
practiced for selfish reasons, to get a break in return. The tension be-
tween these norms not only creates the ambiguities in how the GAIT as
an agreement is applied, but it is also the source of the "ricketiness"3 in
the GATT as an institution that applies the agreement.4
Another noticeable tension is the way the majority of the GAIT
contracting parties, or members, live up to their GAIT contractual obli-
gations. On the one hand, they profess the GAIT ideal of open and
transparent trade, while, on the other hand, they make unilateral, bilat-
eral, or regional trading associations in which trade in some goods occurs
not only outside of the scope of the GAIT, but is consequently protected
or managed to give the trading association an advantage by controlling
the trade in that area.
I am also acutely aware, after observing three major impasses occur
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct 30, 1947, as amended
through June 27, 1966, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATTI].
2. Finlayson & Zacher, The GA TT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers" Regime Dynamics and
Functions, 35 INT'L ORG. 561, 566-70, 574-78 (1981).
3. Interview with delegate (Oct 23, 1990). Over the course of three and a half months I inter-
viewed several delegates to the Uruguay Round as well as some GATT staff members. Because
some of the topics we discussed were very sensitive some delegates asked for anonymity. Therefore,
I am not listing the names of those interviewed.
4. See infra text accompanying note 36. As an organization, the GAIT consists of all the mem-
bers who, when acting jointly as a political body, comprise the Contracting Parties, the Council, the
executive organ of the Contracting Parties, and the Staff. OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMrrA-
TIONS IN THE GAT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 44-54 (1985).
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in agriculture, in services and in dispute settlement, that multilateral
trade liberalization under the auspices of a legally binding treaty means
different things to different people. To the GAIT staff, trade liberaliza-
tion is a strongly supported ideal. They use the occasion of a trading
round to shape an ever larger, less rickety and more institutionalized
GATT organization. Indeed, the staff work diligently to contain the
members' behavior that seeks to gain special and privileged access to
world markets by finding ways to stretch the GATT articles to their
breaking point.
To some developing countries, trade liberalization is a fairy tale be-
cause they perceive the GATT organization as an extension of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),5 the
GATT treaty as a set of rules that permits the rich to get richer at their
expense and the GATT norms as propaganda for capitalism and eco-
nomic inequity. To the major powers, trade liberalization can be a slo-
gan that encapsulates the idea that what is good for our multinational
corporations is good for us and the world.
When one considers the economic philosophy that underlies it, mul-
tilateral trade liberalization seems a myth.' Removing barriers to trade,
such as tariffs and quotas, which is what trade liberalization is all about,
is described as a good both for the economy of the trading states and for
the welfare of their individual citizens.7 Commodities get to markets,
their cost goes down, trade imbalances are reduced and standards of liv-
5. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is a group of industrialized
nations that fosters economic growth among its members. The organization began with the Conven-
tion for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, opened for signature Dec. 14,
1960, 888 U.N.T.S.0. (entered into force Jan. 1, 1961). The original signatories to the Convention
were Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. Additional signatories include Australia, Aus-
tria, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands and New Zealand.
6. See The Free-traders Flawed Ideology, Fin. Times, Nov. 13, 1990, at 40, col. 1 (stating that
the "whole concept of the GAT round in relation to agriculture," which is the dream of a "totally
free world market for food," is an "economist's dream," a "figment of the imagination, and that is all
it will ever be").
7. Jousting for Advantage, ECONOMIST (Special Supp.), Sept. 22, 1990, at 1, 14-19 [hereinafter
Jousting]; Baldwin, The Economics of the GAT, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 82, 84-
85 (Peter Oppenheimer ed. 1980); A Lifeboat for Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 15; H. KA-
TRAK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 52-83 (1971); F. LEUTWILER &
B. BRADLEY, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 23-31 (1985)
[hereinafter LEUTWILER]; See generally D. PAPAGEORGIOU, A. CHOSKI & M. MICHAELY, LINER-
ALISING FOREIGN TRADE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE (1990)
(World Bank study of 19 countries between the end of WWII and 1984 showing that quick phase out
of quantitative restrictions on imports is key to successful trade liberalization in developing
countries).
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ing approach relative maxima for all liberalizing trading partners. Trade
liberalization relies heavily on the belief that all trading partners should
have the same chances to buy and sell in the marketplace as any other
partner. Thus, an open market with transparent rules of operation and
equal access for all is expected to insure fair competition. In turn, an
open and transparent market is expected to insure efficiency in producing
the traded commodities. That is, an open market "decides" which trad-
ing nation will possess a comparative advantage relative to all other trad-
ing nations in a particular commodity. That nation will have produced
the entity at a lower cost, thereby enabling it to be sold at a lower price.
This view about the inherent fairness of the market as creator of
comparative advantage encompasses a world view about how the market
should work and what its goals should be.' Such a world view includes
the belief that, once conferred by the market, a comparative advantage is
generally not expected to change.9 However, everyday experience belies
that belief. America fears that Japan will outproduce it in cars and elec-
tronics; France fears that Argentina will outproduce it in wheat; Italy
fears that Morocco will outproduce it in fresh vegetables; Germany fears
that Eastern Europe will learn how to broker deals for itself. Classic
comparative advantage theory does not take into account relative and
absolute changes in a nation's ability to produce, fluctuations in mone-
tary exchange rates, real differences in market access due to psychologi-
cal or nationalistic preferences, balance of payments difficulties, or
infrastructural inability to get goods to markets.10
Additionally, after watching the Uruguay Round go into impasse
while trying to accomplish multilateral trade liberalization in some areas
of trade that nations protect ferociously, I am aware that the ideal of a
"fair fight," refereed by the rational action of players in the market seek-
ing the best bargains and the ideal of an efficient and fair market that
allows each trader to find its own natural comparative advantage, is
what the GAIT as agreement and as organization declares to be driving
multilateral trade liberalization toward.1 That is, the GATT embodies
these joint ideals about a fair, impersonal market creating a natural com-
parative advantage. All contracting parties of the GAT enjoy MFN
status with respect to each other. By giving all contracting parties equal
8. For a critique of the myths that underlie economic liberalism, see Strange, Protectionism and
World Politics, 39 INT'L ORG. 233, 235-245 (1985). For a review of the myths that underlie protec-
tionism, see DiLorenzo, The Case for Free Trade, 1989/2 ECON. IMPACr 13 (1989).
9. For a discussion of comparative advantage, see Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A10, col. 3.
10. Jousting, supra note 7, at 16, 19-20.
11. Id. at 25-29.
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access to an open market according to their comparative advantage, as
written into Article 1 of the Agreement, nondiscrimination or MFN
treatment among GATT members is the basis in the GATT for multilat-
eral trade liberalization. 12
In practice there are two kinds of nondiscrimination: unconditional
and conditional. Unconditional nondiscrimination is the principle em-
bodied in Article 1 of the Agreement and requires that a GAIT member
who removes a trade barrier or gives a trade benefit to one GATT mem-
ber must do the same for all other members. The assumption behind
unconditional discrimination is that all GATT members will open access
to their markets, although nowhere in the GATT is it written that mem-
bers must open their markets.
Since some GAIT members, especially the less-developed countries,
have been slow to liberalize their trade, and developed countries have
generally done most of the liberalizing of their markets, the developed
world began to perceive that less-developed countries were acting as
"free-riders" on the GATT liberalized trade train. To combat the free-
rider problem; the developed world instituted the practice of conditional
nondiscrimination toward some GATT members. Conditional nondis-
crimination is the practice whereby a GATT member offers easier access
to its market on the condition that all trading partners have to offer some
trade concession in return."3 This practice of conditional MFN treat-
ment is just another aspect of the reciprocity rule, which is the other
pillar of the GATT, although generally an unwritten and often unac-
knowledged one. It assumes that liberalized trade and open access to
markets is not always an automatic benefit. Indeed, the very practice of
granting conditional MFN by some GATT members demonstrates an
inherent structural weakness in the GATT as an agreement and illus-
trates that trade liberalization as a fair fight is a myth. 4
12. Article I of the GATT, supra note 1, states:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exporta-
tion, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any prod-
uct originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
13. Hufbauer & Schott, Toward a "Growth Round" of Trade Talks, 1986/2 EcON. IMPAcT 14,
16-19 (1986).
14. Jousting, supra note 7, at 19-20.
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Even though GAIT members find ways to get around the norm of
unconditional nondiscrimination and to act in a protectionistic manner
in order to preserve an "artificial" comparative advantage by using tar-
iffs, quotas, subsidies, etc., multilateral liberalization under the auspices
of the GATT is about acting on the ideal of unconditional nondiscrimi-
nation to set up liberalized trade agreements. It is this norm of uncondi-
tional nondiscrimination that makes GATT members view multilateral
trade liberalization as a good thing. However, the inherent weakness in
the GATT is that there is no provision within the Agreement to force
members to act in accordance with that ideal. The GATT as a trade
treaty can not force a member to offer trade concessions or choose to
liberalize. Thus, from a realist's perspective, what drives trade liberaliza-
tion is not only the belief that all members will benefit equally and fairly
(few nations are really concerned if any other nation got a fair shake),
but also the need to get the best deal for oneself. Nations have joined the
GATT and cooperated in granting nondiscrimination to all other mem-
bers because they, in turn, will get the benefit of MFN status on any
GATT deal between any GATT trading partners. What trade liberaliza-
tion under the GATT is about, then, is a balancing between reciprocity
and nondiscrimination, between making the best deal for itself that a
member can and having to share that deal with the rest of the GATT
members."1
Because of this tension, the GATT possesses an inherent and neces-
sary structural weakness in that, during trade negotiations to create a
new set of trade obligations under the GATT, if a proper balance be-
tween reciprocity and nondiscrimination is not struck, an impasse will
occur. This Note discusses an example of that tension at work. This
Note also discusses why negotiations to liberalize trade in agriculture
during the latest round of trade negotiations, called the Uruguay Round,
held under the auspices of the GATT, has so far 6 resulted in an impasse;
that is, why the Round has not yet produced a concrete agreement in
agriculture.
The body of this Note is divided into four sections. Section 2, enti-
15. See Strange, supra note 8, at 256-259; Yarbrough & Yarbrough, International Institutions
and the New Economics of Organization, 44 INT'L ORG. 235, 244-250 (1990); Hufbauer & Schott,
supra note 13, at 16.
16. The Uruguay Round was scheduled to end in December 1990 with the Brussels conference
of Trade Ministers. However, because of the impasse in the talks on agriculture, no agreement was
reached and the Round is still in limbo as of this writing. For a good quick review of what the
Round could achieve, see Ruggieri, The Uruguay Round: Effects on U.S. Business, N. Y. L. J., Feb.
7, 1991, at 5, col. 1.
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tled The GATT, discusses the development of the GATT both as a treaty
and as an organization, and includes a run-through of the liberalized ac-
complishments of the seven previous negotiating rounds. Section 3, The
Uruguay Round, provides an exposition of the history of the UR, includ-
ing why it was commenced, what its original goals and expectations
were, and what the starting positions of the major players were. Also
discussed are how negotiating positions and expectations evolved (espe-
cially since the Midterm Declaration in 1989), what happened in the last
three months of the Round and what resulted from of the Brussels Minis-
terial Meeting in December 1990.
Section 4, entitled Analysis, examines why the Brussels Conference
ended up in impasse by looking at the political, ideological and organiza-
tional factors that influenced the outcome. Political variables include
largely external influences on negotiators, such as private interest group
lobbying and changes in political clout that some developing agricultural
exporters experienced during the Round. The ideological factor dis-
cussed is the difference in the way the United States (U.S.) and the Euro-
pean Community (EC), the major players in the agricultural
negotiations, interpreted the reciprocity principle of the GAIT. Organi-
zational factors include the lobbying done by the GAT staff to change
the position of some of the negotiators, as well as the pervasive belief that
negotiated agreements can only be achieved on the basis of consensus, a
process that tends to silence opposing views by not allowing them. In
conclusion, Section 5, Significance, reflects on the significance of the
Brussels impasse in agriculture for the future of the GATT and the world
trading system.
The goal of this Note is to clarify the role of the GATT, both as an
international treaty creating legal obligations and as an organization with
a structure and policy that attempts to apply the treaty. It also attempts
to show that given the reality of inequalities in resources and in market
access of trading partners, the most effective way to liberalize trade of
heavily subsidized commodities may not be to aim for the big, ambitious
treaty that liberalizes quickly, and consequently too painfully, but may
be to go for the modest yet concrete agreement that liberalizes slowly yet
irreversibly with very strong enforcement provisions.
2.0 THE GAIT
2.1 History
The GAT originated in 1944 during World War II out of the
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Breton Woods conference in which the allied powers, especially the Brit-
ish and the Americans, planned how to return the world to economic
normalcy in the troubled post-war era. Of priority were monetary and
fiscal matters; international trade was not really or realistically dealt
with.17 From November 1947 to March 1948, a charter establishing the
International Trade Organization (ITO), complete with specified func-
tioning and goal, staff, policy, action program and dispute settlement
process, was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment at Havana.18 At about the same time as the Havana
Conference, the GATT was negotiated in Geneva, with the expectation
that it would be an addendum to the Havana charter. However, the Ha-
vana charter was never ratified by the requisite number of states and did
not come into force. Thus, the ITO never came into being, leaving the
GAIT as the only multilateral agreement on which the world's powers
could hang their hopes for the internationalism and liberalization of
trade. Although the GATT's uniqueness as the only available world
trade treaty has persisted throughout its history, it still has not come into
force. 9 The original twenty-three contracting states abide by the GATT
as a binding international obligation because of the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application, and later states are bound because of their individual
accession protocols.2'
17. Out of the Breton Woods conference came two institutions, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, and a commitment to create a third, the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO). Jackson, GA7T and Recent International Trade Problems, I1 MD. J. INT'L LAW &
TRADE 1, 5-6 (1987) [hereinafter Jackson, GAT and Recent International Trade Problems]. There
were no trade ministers at Breton Woods, only ministers of finance. Id.
18. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization and Final Act and Related Documents (Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947 - Mar. 24,
1948), UN Doc. ICITO/l/4/1948, U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 3117 (1947) [hereinafter Havana Char-
ter]. The Havana Charter provided a broad framework for thinking about as well as managing trade
issues. Included were provisions that created the ITO pls a wide-ranging discussion that set out a
philosophy on trade policy, employment practices, economic development and restrictive trade prac-
tices. LONG, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Jackson, GATT and Recent International Trade Problems, supra note 17, at 5.
20. Protocol of Provisional Application, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter Provisional Protocol]. LONG, supra note 4, at 11-12; K. DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 341-344 (1970). The Provisional
Protocol states that members would apply provisionally on and after Jan. 1, 1948 Parts I & III of the
General Agreement and Part II "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation."
Thus the Protocol allows that conflicts to specific provisions of Part II created by GATT-inconsis-
tent, pre-existing domestic laws would not be a violation of the General Agreement. DAM, supra at
341-342. The GAIT was accepted by the original contracting states as a stop gap or a fill-in treaty
until the real thing came along. The GATT is still provisionally applied 43 years later, a situation
that one of the working groups in the Uruguay Round discussed changing. It is expected that the
conference on implementing the results of the Uruguay Round (if there are any) to be held later in
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Neither the agreement nor the Provisional Protocol specify an or-
ganization with a staff for administering the agreement.21 Even though it
is provisional and originally only an agreement, the GAIT has evolved
through a pragmatic process into an institution with a staff of over 375
persons. As the number of contracting parties has grown from the origi-
nal twenty-three22 to the present one-hundred,23 the GATT has built up
a staff and an organizational hierarchy in order to develop precedents
and traditions for resolving disputes and for conducting years-long trade
negotiations. These negotiations have resulted in dramatically reduced
1991 will require that Contracting Parties will have to recognize the GATT as having permanent
status when implementing the Round results into their domestic laws. Interview with GAIT Staff
(Dec. 11, 1990).
During an interview in responding to my question about whether the GAT was international
law because of its continuing provisional status as a treaty, a delegate who is also an international
lawyer told me a fable popular in his country. The story went like this: It seems that when God
made the chicken, God was tired and did not want to expend much effort so the chicken was left
with a cloaca, which is an all-purpose orifice for the elimination of bodily wastes as well as for
procreation. The chicken went to God to complain, asking for separate orifices for separate bodily
functions. God told the chicken the cloaca was just provisional. The delegate told me that the
GAIT was a lot like a chicken's cloaca: it would do as trade law until something more specific and
more suited for the job came along. Interview with delegate (Oct. 29, 1990).
21. Early drafts of the GAIT mentioned an organization, but the U.S. Congress told its trade
negotiators that they did not have the authority to enter the U.S. into a GAIT that contained a
clause creating a GAIT institution. Having the U.S. accede to membership in a GAIT which was
only a treaty was regarded as primarily a prerogative of the executive branch, and a weak one at
that. See infra this note. Congress felt that having the U.S. accede to membership in a GAIT which
was a trade organization was fundamentally a Congressional prerogative, requiring Congressional
approval. Jackson, GA TT and Recent International Trade Problems, supra note 17, at 8. See gener-
ally Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH.
L. R. 249, 253-275 (1967) [hereinafter Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law] (explaining that Congress never ratified the GAIT into U.S. law. The
President negotiated the GAIT as a treaty, with the Presidential authority for binding the U.S. to
the GAIT being the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as amended in 1945 (59 Stat. 410 (1945)).
This legal basis may originally not have been adequate to allow the President to commit the U.S. to
the GATT without Congressional approval; nevertheless, all three branches of U.S. government now
act as if GAIT is law.)
Along with Article 22, Article 23 forms the basis for the settlement of GAIT trade disputes,
states that "[tihe Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and
shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be con-
cerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate." It is this power of the Contracting Parties to
act as a kind of political authority to oversee any matter referred to them that has ultimately been
used as the basis to create the entire structure of the GAIT organization.
22. These included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South-
ern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.
23. The 100th member is Costa Rica, who was accepted for membership in September 1990. J.
de Gen6ve, Sept. 27&28, 1990 at 7, col. 4. Three other states have became contracting parties since
April 1990: Tunisia, Bolivia and Venezuela. GAIT, Focus NEWSLETrER No. 75, at 28 (October
1990).
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tariff rates on many kinds of goods. The GATT as an international or-
ganization is continuously expanding and filling a role in the regulation
of international trade affairs that it was never intended to have.
24
2.2 The Structure of the GAIT
2.2.1 The Agreement. To understand the structure of the GATT,
one must look at both the structure of the agreement and the structure of
the organization. The agreement has a total of 38 articles divided into
four parts, plus a preamble, all of which have remained unchanged since
1965.25 The Preamble and Part I, consisting of Articles 1 and 2, set out
the norms of how to create and abide by international trade agreements,
as well as how to conduct international trade relations. These norms
include non-discrimination, also called MFN treatment (Article 1),
transparency (Article 2) and reciprocity (Preamble). 6
Part II comprises Articles 3 through 23, inclusive, which spell out
the bulk of the substantive GATT obligations. Among the most impor-
tant obligations are the following: the Article 11 requirement to eliminate
quantitative restrictions (quotas or licenses) on both imports and ex-
ports;27 the recognition that dumping, or subsidization that results in
dumping, may allow a countervailing or retaliatory action (Articles 6, 15
and 19);28 the acknowledgment in Article 18 that nations experiencing
24. Despite the ambiguities surrounding its legal status, the GATT is a de facto specialized
agency of the UN. LONG, supra note 4, at 45. It is argued that the GAIT has evolved in such a way
so as to function substantively as the Havana Charter meant a trade organization to function.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 57 (2d ed. 1990). Nonethe-
less, it is important to remember that the GAIT's functioning has resulted from its passing through
a stage of about twenty years in the post-Havana Conference period where the GATT was thought
of as the property of the major commercial powers, who did not have to accommodate their trade
practices to the rest of the world. Id Thus, the GATT's provisionality has been "institutionalized"
by the original members' treating the GATT as their private club, which did not need a carved-in-
stone rulebook, and by subsequent members' trepidation about not wanting to be bound by the
carved-in-stone rules of a club that would exploit them.
25. The last protocol that amended the body of the Agreement was the Protocol Amending the
GATT to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, T.I.A.S. 6139, 17 U.S.T.
1977 (entered into force June 27, 1966). Out of the Kennedy and Tokyo'Rounds have come addi-
tional codes that are not part of the agreement itself but are adhered to by many contracting parties
on a voluntary basis. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
26. Jousting, supra note 7, at 7.
27. The GATT reduces trade barriers by "tariffying" border measures and then progressively
and systematically reduce the tariffs. Id; Hutbauer & Schott, supra note 13, at 16.
28. Article 19, which allows emergency action against dumped imports that cause injury to a
domestic industry, is generally referred to as the "safeguard clause" of the GAIT. It is the subject
of much controversy because many developed nations have adopted "grey-area measures," which
are questionably legitimated by the safeguard clause. Such measures include § 301 of the U.S. 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Pub. L. 100-418, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, codified
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
balance of payments difficulties may derogate from their GATT responsi-
bilities by withdrawing a trade concession already negotiated without
having to pay any retribution;29 and the Article 23 provision for settling
disputes when a contracting party believes any of its benefits accruing to
the Agreement has been nullified or impaired.30
Part III of the GATT includes Articles 24 through 35, inclusive,
and deals with a few substantive obligations but mainly with the proce-
dural mechanics of entering into the GATT and of applying its provi-
sions. The more important concepts in Part III comprise the Article 25
definition of Joint Action by the Contracting Parties31 and the Article 28
process of modifying a negotiated trade concession.32
The three Articles, 36 through 38, of Part IV were not in the origi-
nal 1947 version of the GATT, but were added in 1965 3 during a time
when former colonies were emerging as independent nations. Part IV
promotes trade in developing nations in mainly philosophic, non-prag-
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Trade Act] which pries open foreign markets, thereby
creating GATT "benefits" to which the U.S. believes itself entitled, and the European Community's
voluntary export restraints that counteract and prevent the "dumping" of exports whose injury to
domestic industries is in question. A strengthening of the safeguard clause to prevent grey.area
measures was negotiated during the UR.
See generally P. Kleen, The Safeguard Issue in the Uruguay Round-A Comprehensive Approach,
23 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1989) (taking a holistic approach to examine how strengthening Article 19
in the Uruguay Round talks will necessarily affect the negotiations in several other areas, such as
textiles, and may change a whole range of protectionist practices, such as voluntary export restraints
(VER's), the free-rider problem, and the unfair imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing
duties).
29. Article 18 is often referred to as the "balance of payments exception" to the GATT, which,
according to many developed countries, has been used by developing countries to wriggle out of
GATT obligations and to catch a free ride from the opened markets of the developed world. See
Stewart, Proposals for a Review of GATdrticle XVIIl" An Assessment, in URUGUAY ROUND: PA-
PERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 1 UNCTAD/ITP/10 (1989) (for a review of some developed c6untries',
especially the U.S.'s, proposals in the Uruguay Round for cutting back the developing world's use of
the balance-of-payments exception of the GATf).
30. Article 23 is the heart of the GATT dispute settlement process, which was also an area
under negotiation during the Round. Like services, agriculture and trade-related investment meas-
ures (TRIMS), dispute settlement experienced an impasse at the ministerial meeting held at Brussels
in December 1990. Interview with GATT Staff (Dec. 11, 1990).
31. Article 25 reads in part: "Wherever reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting
parties acting jointly they are designated as the Contracting Parties." Importantly, Article 25 allows
the Contracting Parties to waive a GATT obligation imposed upon any contracting party by the
Agreement.
32. If Article 25 allows the Contracting Parties acting jointly to waive a GATT obligation for
any party, Article 28 allows any contracting party to opt itself out of a trade concession negotiated
into a GATT schedule, but at a cost. The party withdrawing the concession may have to pay com-
pensation, and the other contracting parties affected may withdraw an equivalent concession upon
notice within six months of the original withdrawal.
33. See supra note 25.
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matic terms. It urges the Contracting Parties to commit to joint action
to consider special measures that would ease trading barriers to the de-
veloping world, but does not specify a program for action or enumerate
specific duties owed to less developed members.
2.2.2 The GAIT Organization. As used throughout this Note, the
organization of the GATT means both the roles that comprise the bu-
reaucracy that functions to fulfill the provisions of the Agreement, and
the individuals who fill those roles. The number and nature of GATT
roles change whenever there is a negotiating round. During a round, the
GATT organization has three different roles: the Contracting Parties and
the GATT Council, the GATT Staff"4 and the Round negotiators. Each
role has its own configuration, political environment, goals and func-
tions. A later section discusses the roles of Round negotiators. This sec-
tion focuses on the GATT organization during the inter-round phase,
that is, on the Contracting Parties and the GATT Council and the
GATT Staff.
2.2.2.1 The Contracting Parties and the GATr Council. Article
25 of the Agreement states that the "[r]epresentatives of the contracting
parties shall meet from time to time for [effectuating] those provisions of
the Agreement which involve joint action and... [for facilitating their]
operation," and that whenever the contracting parties act "jointly, they
are designated as the Contracting Parties." The Contracting Parties as a
group legislate changes to the Agreement and possess a quasi-judicial
function in settling disputes." The Contracting Parties act jointly at an
annual meeting during which they may grant waivers from GATT obli-
gations to member countries, adopt modifications to GATT articles, and
pronounce the resolution of disputes between members by adopting the
reports of panels assigned to settle disputes.36
The GATT Council was established by the Contracting Parties in
June 1960. 37 The Council is comprised of all of the Contracting Parties
plus a group of high-level staff members of the GATT administration.
34. I prefer to use the word staff instead of secretariat. No staff is specified in the GATT
agreement.
35. This paper follows the standard procedure of using the form "Contracting Parties" to desig-
nate the legislative, judicial and political role of the contracting parties in joint action.
36. LONG, supra note 4, at 46.
37. Some argue that since the Agreement does not specify a secretariat, and since the existence
of the Council was created only by ajoint action of the Contracting Parties, and since the Agreement
implies only a vague political competence to the Contracting Parties, members ought to consider the
GATT as without a real organization-as only an ad hoe structure-in order to facilitate the crea-
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These staff members act as permanent administrators to organize and
record the Council meetings, to set the agenda and to advise the Presi-
dent of the Council on the issues to be addressed at each meeting. Be-
tween the annual meetings of the Contracting Parties, the GATT
Council, as the executive organ of the Contracting Parties, takes on the
legislative and quasi-judicial functioning of the group and actually does
most of the joint action of the group as well. It sets up working parties to
examine trade issues of interest, it establishes panels to review dispute
claims, and in approving the findings of these reports, the Council acts in
a judicial capacity to settle disputes.38
The Council meets approximately ten times per year and is usually
attended by each member's permanent delegate to the GATT, a prestigi-
ous position in the hierarchy of trade delegations. Having attended two
Council meetings, I believe that what engages the Council most are re-
quests for temporary waivers, the adoption of dispute resolution panel
reports, the airing of disputes and the creation of working parties to ex-
amine a trade issue. What was interesting about how the Council oper-
ated was not what it accomplished, but how Council members interacted
with each other; in other words, the political cleavages among them. For
example, the U.S. and the EC often found themselves at odds on a vari-
ety of issues, whereas Canada, the U.S., Australia and New Zealand
often agreed. Chile, Brazil, India and Thailand were quite vocal and
served as mouthpieces for the developing nations. With the exception of
Cote d'Ivoire and Tunisia, Africa's voices were usually silent.
2.2.2.2 The GATT Staff. As mentioned above, a GATT staff is
not explicitly provided for in the Agreement. Nonetheless, inasmuch as
the Contracting Parties approve the annual budget for the GATT, funds
for which are levied against each contracting party, the GATT staff is
approved by a joint action of the Contracting Parties. The GAT staff
now consists of well over 375 persons. There are divisions, such as those
for agriculture, tariffs, services, non-tariffs, and technical barriers, which
roughly correspond to the areas under negotiation during a round. The
general function of the staff between negotiating rounds is to review and
research the status of world trade in these areas. During a negotiating
tion of a bona fide, legal reality. See generally Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal
Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978) [hereinafter Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions].
38. "[S]trictly speaking, it is only when the Contracting Parties adopt the annual report of the
Council that any interpretation by a panel of GAIT provisions referred to in that report becomes
legally authoritative." LONG, supra note 4, at 47. The Council also has authority to approve waivers
for derogating from a GATT obligation.
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round, the staff from these divisions may also act as secretaries to the
chairmen of the various negotiating groups, taking notes on the negotiat-
ing meetings and composing draft documents upon which negotiations
proceed.
Since the staff exists largely out of the exigency of having to admin-
ister the GATT for the Contracting Parties and is an entity created by
their discretionary power and presumably has no formal power of its
own, there is relatively little written about the functioning or the infor-
mal power of the GATT staff, either by GATT itselfW
9 or by others.40
This is ironic given the potential of the staff during a round to interact
with all of the delegates, to be the most informed about what is going on
in the negotiations and consequently, to lobby the delegates to change
their positions.
2.3 Decision by Consensus
The way in which the GATT organization, either the Contracting
Parties, the Council, or during a negotiating round the trade delegates,
takes decisions is by consensus.41 Consensus works this way: an issue
will be raised on the floor of the meeting, be it the Contracting Parties'
Session, Council meeting or a negotiating group meeting. The chairman
39. A GATT staff member told me that all publications produced by the staff must be approved
by the Director-General's office. Interview with GATT Staff (Oct. 25, 1990).
40. Given that sessions of the Contracting Parties and Council Meetings are closed to the pub-
lic, there is generally little opportunity to observe the GATT organization first hand unless one is
considered an academic insider, that is, a recognized legal or economics scholar who publishes pro-
GATT articles, such as John Jackson, Robert Hudec and Kenneth Dam. DAM, supra note 20, at
335-341. Most of the material that I have read describing the GATT staff faults it for being too rigid
or not flexible enough to deal with dispute settlement matters and grey-area safeguard measures
effectively either because the staff has not been formally institutionalized into the GATT agreement
or because the GATT treaty has not been formally constitutionalized into members' domestic laws.
Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and Pro-
posals for Strengthening the GA 7T Dispute Settlement Procedures, in THE NEw GATT ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONs: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 285 (Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf ed. 1988); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT Dispute Settlement
System and Uruguay Negotiations on its Reform, in LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 53
(Sarcevic & Van Houtte ed. 1990).
Yet strengthening the procedural rigor of GATT dispute settlement machinery can only do so
much, since implementation of settlement results depends on the consensus of the parties involved.
It is believed that role of the GATT staff could be expanded to fill a void in GATT legal reform by
its neutrality. HUDEC, supra note 24, at 290-297.
41. P. KOHONA, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THROUGH
LAW 99 (1985). The GATT Council decides by consensus. The Contracting Parties strongly abide
by the norm of unanimity and consensus even though consensus is not mentioned in the agreement.
S. Voitovich, Normative Acts of the International Economic Organizations in International Law-Mak-
ing, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 21, 22 (1990).
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(in all the meetings I observed it was always a man) asks for comments
from any and all attending representatives who wish to speak. At the
end of all comments the chairman may force a political decision 42 to be
taken or postpone it until after a working party, if one has been commis-
sioned, reports its results or until after more consultations.43 After such
consultations or a report has been issued, the chairman will, at a subse-
quent meeting, take a political decision.4"
During a negotiating round, the chairmen of the various negotiating
groups use GATT staff members assigned to the corresponding staff divi-
sion as support to engage in informal consultations, to write drafts of
discussions at previous meetings and to lobby for specific positions. The
staf, acting as support, have wide and unseen discretion to foster one
position at the expense of others.45 Since there are one-hundred plus
members, as different as Switzerland, Sri Lanka, and Singapore, who
have strongly competing and divergent interests, the norm of decision by
consensus tends to silence anti-majoritarian views, which are often put
forth by economically smaller and less politically powerful members.
Thus, the non-discriminatory treatment written into the Agreement in
Article 1 is easily feigned by the political decision-making of the
organization. 46
42. A "political decision" is a bit of GATT jargon that means that some anti-majoritarian
views, even those strongly-held, will be withdrawn, excluded or expunged from the final agreement
of the issue in order to create a consensus. Taking a political decision does not necessarily imply a
compromise, but it does imply that dissent has in some way been dissolved.
43. "After more consultations" means the chairman will informally discuss the issue with those
delegates whom he is entirely at his discretion to canvass. Generally, the delegates who are dissent-
ing will be canvassed in the hopes that they will take a political decision and modify their position or
work out an acceptable compromise.
44. Consensus is by no means a written requirement of the Agreement. Voitovich, supra note
41, at 22. However, it is a strongly-held norm of GAIT behavior, buttressed by the belief that
negotiation is the best way to accommodate and incorporate into GATT documentation political
differences between members. Voting to allow a majoritarian view to rule is regarded as silencing
minoritarian interests and voices. KOHONA, supra note 41, at 8-9, 99, 101, 116, 136, 166.
45. For more detail about the role of the stag during a negotiating round, see infra text accom-
panying notes 336-337.
46. The GATT is by no means the only international economic organization (IEO) that takes
decisions by consensus. Other IEOs that rely on the norm of unanimity and consensus include the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFrA) (see infra note 161 for definition), and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). Voitovich, supra note 41, at 22. There has been a trend since the 1960s towards agreement
by consensus and away from majoritadanism. Id.; KOHONA, supra note 41, at 85.
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2.4 GATT Philosophy
2.4.1 Liberalism. While the above description of the GATT as
agreement and as organization is useful as a background to understand-
ing what occurred during the UR, the following discussion on the philos-
ophy underlying the GATT and the norms of behavior arising from the
interpretation of the agreement is critical.
Liberalism is the philosophic basis of the GAT twice over. In its
economic manifestation, liberalism grounds the GATT in laissez-faire ec-
onomics, 47 a concept which Adam Smith developed and which David
Ricardo operationalized with his idea of comparative advantage.48 Eco-
nomic liberalism is a philosophy espousing the idea that free or liberal-
ized trade is an economic ideal that all nation-states should strive for.49
By opening up access to the market for all, liberalized trade makes all
trading partners better off than they would otherwise be, even though
47. See G. MYRDAL, THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THE-
ORY 14-139 (Paul Streeten trans. 1969) and UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 142-235 (1976) as
the basis for the explication below of liberalism as a philosophy. Liberalism in economic theory
derives from philosophy that pre-dates Adam Smith, generally considered the founder of modern
economic liberalist thought. Economic liberalism is grounded in the philosophy of natural law,
reawakened during the Middle Ages, which holds that there are such absolute categories as a natural
order and a natural value of things. From these concepts of order and value grew the doctrine of
laissez-faire, of letting nature find its own economic order and of letting the natural order find the
intrinsic natural value of things and of labor. This school of positive economic theory, developed by
the Physiocrats, who were inspired by contemporaneous Rousseauesque ideas of the social contract,
represented the economic order as a circular flow of a series of exchanges between individuals and
classes. This flow eventually found an equilibrium position to which actual exchanges tended to
move. Adam Smith took up the idea of exchange equilibrium, using the concept of normal price as
natural price.
Another school of thought important to economic liberalism is utilitarianism, which acted as a
buttress for the philosophy of natural law. Utilitarianism also views sociopolitical goals in creating a
social or economic order in an objective light. That is, utilitarianism does not view a social or
economic order as natural, but as useful-which is an objective category, like natural-based on
some objective criterion of utility. From utilitarianism came the concept of marginal utility, which
states that price is determined at the margin. This concept together with equilibrium theory is the
basis for modern price-formation theory.
48. Jousting, supra note 7, at 12-19; Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A10, col 3. Comparative
advantage is ultimately based on a nation's possession of a greater abundance of natural resource
than any others. Id. Given the opportunity to trade, each country will specialize in those commodi-
ties in which it has a comparative advantage, exporting these in exchange for other commodities in
which it has a comparative disadvantage. J. INGRAM, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcs 269 (1983).
As originally conceived, comparative advantage was static and unchanging because resources
were thought to be fixed. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A10, col. 3. But comparative advantage
among nations can change in many ways, one of them being that nations artificially create an advan-
tage for their own products by setting up barriers against imports into their domestic markets. Id.
49. See, eg., LEurWILER, supra note 7 for a representative GAIT publication strongly typify-
ing the free trade ideal as well as the GATT organization's attachment to it.
934 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
"trade does not equalise incomes when productivity differs across
countries."50
In its political manifestation, liberalism grounds the GATT into the
multilateralism that created the United Nations, the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank at the end of World War II. The work-
ing premise behind the GATT was that because power relationships were
unequal between nations, the creation of an international agreement
where all nations, rich and poor, would be treated alike in terms of trade
obligations and trade benefits would lessen political tensions. Further,
tensions would lessen as all nations took part in the improvement of their
respective standards of living, which would result from their economic
cooperation and openness.
51
2.4.2 Norms. The liberalist philosophy underlying the creation of
the GATT has emphasized both a free-trade52 vision of international
trade, that is, open, unmanaged trade without border protection maxi-
mizes benefit to all traders under all conditions and in all circumstances,
as well as several norms of behavior appropriate for achieving that vision.
The most important norms are non-discrimination (MFN), transparency
50. Jousting, supra note 7, at 15.
51. Baldwin, supra note 7, at 82-83. The nature of the social contract that underlies the GATT
is the association of interest, whose basis is "that [humans] will abide by relatively stable standards
of interaction because they believe it to be to their mutual advantage to do so rather than because
they participate in an identical vision of the truth and the good." UNGER, supra note 47, at 144-45.
This association of interest is nothing but the reciprocity, give-to-get, norm that I believe not only
explains the behavior that led to the impasse at the Brussels conference, but also can broadly predict
what kind of agreement in agriculture might eventually be decided upon.
52. In this Note the term "free trade" is used interchangeably with the term "liberalized trade."
Some make the distinction that free trade is trade without any barriers on the exchange of goods,
that is, no quotas, no licensing restrictions, no tariffs. See, eg., BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 33-35
(1988); cf Finn, World Without Borders, FoRBas April 17, 1989 at 118 (for a delightfully self-
contradictory look at an argument for free trade by setting up a "free-trade" zone made up of OECD
countries that will bypass the GATT because the GATT has become too unwieldy, what with all the
developing "free-riders," whereas liberalized trade occurs when some, but not all, barriers are re-
duced).
Although I acknowledge these distinctions, I see free trade not as a separate category but as a
kind of liberalized trade. Also, I do not see the goal of the GATT as world free trade (and even the
GATT does not insist that free trade is its absolute goal, see LEUTwILER, supra note 7). The process
of removing trade barriers is the same for liberalized trade as it is for free trade because it relies on
the same set of ideals, goals, and norms about why it is good to remove such barriers and how best to
do that. However, because of national interest and the reciprocity principle acting in all trade nego-
tiations, I believe liberalized, and not free, trade is the actual goal sought in trade talks. See Carmi-
chael, National Interest and International Trade Negotiations, 9 WORLD ECON. 341 (1986) for a
thorough and realistic discussion of the survival policies that nations adopt to protect domestic
industries in trade negotiations.
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and reciprocity. 3 Other important norms include the goal to safeguard
the liberalized agreements once they are achieved, the goal to aid coun-
tries in development and the aim to strengthen multilateralism.
At the heart of the free-trade philosophy 4 is the unconditional non-
discrimination norm, or MFN treatment, stemming from Article 1 of the
Agreement. This norm requires that members not treat any other mem-
ber preferentially in making trade concessions, but treat all other mem-
bers equally favorably, that is, as the most favored nations are treated.
With the goal of transparency, also called the liberalization norm,"5
the Agreement strives to convert all those trade barriers that protect the
price of goods from being set by the demands of the market, such as
quotas, licensing restrictions, and subsidies, into tariffs. Tariffs must
then be bound,5 6 and, through periodic negotiating, must be continually
lowered.
5 7
53. Jousting, supra note 7, at 7; Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 2, at 566-578; Curzon &
Curzon, Non-discrimination and the Rise of 'Material' Reciprocity, 12 WORLD ECON. 481, 482-3
(1989); Curtis, Book Review, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 399, 399-400 (1988) (reviewing
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSrEM (1987)). See also Carmichael,
supra note 52 (discussing how the reciprocity principle works in terms of national policies to protect
economic advantage or efficiency).
54. Compare Curtis, supra note 53, for the view that merely liberalized trade has been the goal
of the GATT. This distinction is important because if one posits free trade as the GAIT goal,
unconditional nondiscrimination might be the more important norm. If one posits liberalized trade
as the GATT goal, conditional discrimination, that is, acting reciprocally, might be the more impor-
tant norm.
However, I am suggesting that the type of trade barrier to be reduced-tariff or nontariff-is a
more important category than the overall goal of free vs. liberalized trade when determining which
norm of behavior-MFN or reciprocity-will govern in trade negotiations. It is arguable that re-
ducing tariffs-where the trade benefits are more clearly measurable, acting with non-discrimination
is easy and appropriate because all members can know what they are giving up and what they are
receiving in return. But in reducing non-tariff barriers, as was the case in the agriculture negotia-
tions in the UR, where trade benefits are not so clearly measurable, acting with reciprocity is argua-
bly more appropriate.
55. Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 2, at 570.
56. Binding a tariff fixes a tariff percentage rate for a particular good and is a promise not to
raise the rate in the future. Tariffbindings are listed in schedules of tariff concessions which become
part of the GATT treaty. Currently, there are forty volumes of tariff schedules. Each country has
its own schedule of tariff bindings. For example, in the U.S. tariff schedule besides the word "bi-
cycles it might say 'five percent' and that means that the United States cannot charge more than a
five percent tariff under the GAIT." Jackson, GATT and Recent International Trade Problems,
supra note 17, at 10.
57. Through Article 2 schedules of negotiated concessions, i.e., tariff bindings and reductions as
well as quota reductions, removal of licensing restrictions, etc., become part of the Agreement itself.
Every trade concession agreed to in all of the previous trading rounds have been put into Annexes of
the GATT, which are part and parcel of the Agreement. Thus, every GAIT trading concession and
obligation is written into the Agreement and therefore known and transparent.
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Reciprocity is that ideal which promotes exchanges of trade conces-
sions. If one member lowers a trade barrier, a country who benefits is
expected to lower its own barriers in an equivalent, if not identical, way.
Unlike transparency and non-discrimination, reciprocity is not techni-
cally written into any one article of the Agreement, and is a more diffuse
norm presented in the Preamble and in the way that various articles re-
late to each other to create complex and general obligations.
These three norms acting in concert have been responsible for re-
ducing tariffs on many goods from a 40% rate in 1947, to roughly a 5%
rate by the start of the UR in late 1986.58 Reciprocity and unconditional
MFN working in tandem to lower tariffs have a powerful push-pull ef-
fect. For example, when one member lowers its barriers on certain goods
to gain access to another member's market, that member, because of the
unconditional nondiscrimination principle, must give the same conces-
sion on the same goods to all third party members, who in turn are ex-
pected to reciprocate by lowering barriers in an equivalent way on either
the same or different goods.
However, the reciprocity norm can also erode the effects of uncondi-
tional MFN because of the bilateral way most trade concessions (and
certainly all concessions on agricultural products) are negotiated.59 Usu-
ally, negotiations to reduce a trade barrier work bilaterally via the follow-
ing process: the importing country and its principal supplier (an
exporting country) negotiate a concession, which is supposed to extend
to secondary suppliers, who in turn are expected to offer a reciprocal
concession. This is called "principal supplier" negotiation.6° Principal
supplier negotiation therefore creates bilateral concessions negotiated be-
tween two trading partners that are supposed to become multilateral be-
cause of the action of the unconditional MFN principle. If, however, the
secondary suppliers to a country are less-developed countries, without
large import markets, or are not major suppliers, they will often be un-
able to offer reciprocal concessions to the countries creating the bilateral
concession. Furthermore, because the smaller, secondary suppliers can-
not offer reciprocal concessions, the two major powers who cut the initial
deal between themselves may stipulate that their concessions are offered
conditionally to secondary suppliers. That is, only if secondary suppliers
58. Jousting, supra note 7, at 7.
59. See Curzon & Curzon, supra note 53 (discussing reciprocity and conditional MFN in much
greater detail than here. They argue that bilateral trade negotiations result in a sectoral reciprocity,
which does not promote overall trade liberalization, and that multilateral trade negotiations may
achieve a general reciprocity that does promote overall trade liberalization.)
60. Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 2, at 590.
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reciprocate with lowering some of their own trade barriers will the major
trading powers give to secondary suppliers their bilaterally-negotiated
concessions. In essence, this practice of placing conditions on the offer of
a trade concession to some but not all GATT members is called condi-
tional MFN or nondiscrimination, and cuts against the unconditional
MFN norm written into Article 1. The effect of conditional MFN dur-
ing a GATT negotiating round is that secondary supplier countries have
no power to object or accept bilateral concessions between major powers
and are therefore locked out of creating trade policy. It is important to
point out that the principles of conditional MFN and of reciprocity are
the same.
In more recent trading rounds, the norm of multilateralism has, to
some extent, counteracted the effects of bilateralism in the way negotiat-
ing is done via principal supplier negotiation. A negotiating style that
encourages multilateralism, called linear tariff negotiating, is achieved by
reducing tariffs on a class of goods, for example steel products, which
necessarily involves negotiation among a variety of principal and secon-
dary suppliers of a diverse range of goods. However, multilateralism is
not a strong norm in the GATT organization 6' and the reciprocity prin-
ciple still strongly influences trade negotiations.62
The norm to aid countries in development, written into both the
Preamble and Part IV of the Agreement, tends to counteract the princi-
ple of reciprocity. This norm takes into account the relatively low level
of technology and skill and the low profitability of markets in the devel-
oping world, and so reduces the expectation that less developed GATT
members must always offer a reciprocal trade concession when given one
by a more developed member. Through the practice of treating less-de-
veloped nations specially by not requiring them to reciprocate conces-
sions, by allowing them to refuse market access, and by allowing them to
protect infant industry in order to shore up their balance of payments,
the development norm has created what the developed members view as
61. Id. at 589-593. Multilateralism is the norm that promotes a style of negotiating strategy; it
is therefore a procedural rather than a substantive norm, such as MFN or transparency. Substantive
norms are written into the Agreement to identify in a general way what are liberalized trading
benefits and how should liberalized trading agreement should be structured. It can be argued that
reciprocity is both a substantive and a procedural norm because it promotes a give-to-get liberalizing
behavior as well as a bilateral, or major interest, style of negotiating. At any event no procedural
norms on the preferred techniques of negotiating are written into the Agreement. All such norms
form an unspoken tradition arising from what the GATT organization-the Contracting Parties, the
Council, the staff and the trade negotiators-have perceived in the past to be appropriate negotiating
techniques.
62. Interviews with GAIT Staff (Nov. 14 & 15, 1990); Interview with Delegate (Nov. 11, 1990).
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the problem of "free riders."6 Ultimately, the norm of unconditional
MFN, requiring that all members be given all trade concessions regard-
less of their ability to reciprocate and regardless of their economic devel-
opment, can be viewed as distorted by the development norm that
emphasizes preferential treatment for less developed members. It is the
counterbalancing practice of reciprocity and conditional MFN, requiring
all members to give concessions in order to get them, that swings back
the pendulum to maintain the GATT as a trade liberalizing agreement. 4
The goal of safeguarding liberalized trade benefits can act in opposi-
tion to either the unconditional MFN, the reciprocity, or the develop-
ment norms. The safeguard norm arises from several articles in the
Agreement, especially Articles 12, 18, 19 and 25. Articles 12 and 18
together allow the exceptional imposition of quantitative restrictions to
safeguard the balance of payments." Article 19 gives the right for a con-
tracting party to retaliate when, because of a sudden and unforeseen mar-
ket disruption, such as dumping, one of its domestic industries
experiences a bona fide injury or threat of injury. Thus, retaliatory quo-
tas may be imposed after giving notice to the party who is dumping. Not
surprisingly, the safeguard norm preserves the functioning and integrity
of the GATT as a treaty by acting as a built-in safety valve or flexibility-
creating principle that permits the waivers and exceptions necessary to
keep the agreement adhered to in most cases.
GATT norms of behavior operate as a system of counterbalancing
and opposing ideals, which highlight the weak points in the philosophy
of economic liberalism as well as the process of negotiating liberalized
trade agreements. Pro-economic liberalism and free-trade sentiment
surged during the 1960s at the apex of the Cold War and as negotiations
during the Kennedy Round (1963-67) reduced tariffs by the greatest per-
centage ever, or since. At that time, U.S. economists and politicians
viewed the GATT to be healthy, hale, and strong, but best of all, effec-
tive, as they observed it promoting liberalized trade agreements that
largely reduced tariffs.66 However, since the 1970s, as developed coun-
63. The problem of persistent free riders to developed countries has given "rise to the claim that
international trade is 'unfair,' that the playing field is not level. It sows the ground for 'get tough'
policies, such as threats in the United States of retaliatory action under Section 301 [of the 1988
Trade Act]." Curzon & Curzon, supra note 53, at 485.
64. A reciprocity principle or conditional MFN is often viewed as the result of domestic policies
and pressures injected into the negotiation of international trade restrictions. Carmichael, supra note
52, at 343.
65. Imposition of quantitative restrictions is generally prohibited by Article 11.
66. The U.S. has been the major supporter of the GATT, including the use of its dispute settle.
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tries have grown increasingly more protective, erecting more nontariff
barriers to trade, and as developing countries have demanded preferential
treatment that makes access to their markets more difficult, liberalized
trade agreements have not been so wholeheartedly promoted or easily
agreed to.67
ment process, for most of its 42 years. HUDEC, supra note 24, at 249, 288. However, there was a
major decline in the use of GAIT dispute settlement procedures from 1959-1975 because developing
countries did not have confidence that GAIT dispute panels would consider their special needs. Id.
at 249. The U.S. supported the GATT largely because U.S. commercial policy-which focused on
reducing trade barriers-did not undergo fundamental change during this fifteen-year period.
However, the fact that the U.S. has been the major supporter of the GAIT and has provided
political leadership about the value of trade liberalization is proving to be a mixed blessing. On the
one hand, U.S. support prevented a GAIT breakdown during the critical time when the composi-
tion of the GATT changed from a club with 34 similar members in 1959 to a political organization
with a very diverse 100 members in 1973. But on the other hand, as U.S. commercial policy has
become more protectionist since the mid 1970s, U.S. support of the GAIT has dwindled, which has
precipitated conflict about what the GAIT ought to become. Id. at 226, 288. See generally JACK-
SON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT SYSTEM (1990) (discussing what enforcement rules, dispute set-
tlement mechanisms and organizational structure the GAIT ought to formally develop in order to
survive in the post-U.S. support era) [hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAT SYSTEM].
67. Both the Tokyo and the Uruguay Rounds placed as a top priority the strengthening of
GAIT disciplines and the reduction of non-tariff trade barriers in order to check and prevent the
proliferation of protectionist practices. See eg., JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT SYSTEM,
supra note 66.
The U.S. has been particularly frustrated by the "free-rider" problem created by trade agreements
that give preferential trade treatment to less developed nations. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 53, at
490-494. Evidence of mounting frustration on the part of the U.S. includes its increasing use of
voluntary export restraints, or VER's. (VER's are bilateral agreements between importing and ex-
porting partners, whereby the importer requests that the exporter voluntarily limit the number of its
exports. These agreements are often made under the implied threat that the importer will place a
sanction against increased imports by the exporter. Usually, the exporter capitulates to the im-
porter's request to preserve whatever trade flow it already has. VER's are "grey area" measure as far
as the GAIT is concerned: not entirely GAIT-illegal, but certainly thwarting the GAIT spirit of
liberalization).
Some economists are dismayed that the U.S. is generally showing a weakened commitment to
multilateralism and a new interest in regional arrangements. Bhagwati, United States Trade Policy at
the Crossroads, 12 WORLD ECON. 439 (1989). Evidence of a weakened commitment to the GAIT
and multilateralism includes the U.S.'s changing its trade laws to force open closed markets via
Super § 301 of the 1988 Trade Act. See Recent Developments in International Trade: The Implemen-
tation of "Super 301", 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 359 (1990) [hereinafter Recent Developments]; see gener-
ally Behney, Escape Clause Relief in the EEC and the United States Different Approaches to the
Dilemma of Adjustment to a New World Trading Environment, 15 N.C. J. INr'L L. & CoM. REG. 1
(1990) (discussing the general approaches adopted by the U.S. and the EC in applying sanctions
against increased quantities of imports that may damage a domestic industry).
Furthermore, forty leading world economists issued a statement in April 1989 calling for an end
to the "perilous" trade policy of the U.S., which "embraces" managed trade by judging the foreclo-
sure of foreign markets and then retaliating to force an opening up. Statement by Forty Economists
on American Trade Policy, 12 WORLD ECON. 263 (1989).
Other evidence of increasingly protectionist U.S. commercial and trade policy includes the Bush
administration's hedging its bets against a possible Uruguay Round failure by laying the foundation
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At the heart of the developed nations souring on economic liber-
alism is the realization that the notion of comparative advantage does not
automatically work to improve all trading partners' economic position. 8
Comparative advantage does not always work, especially when the devel-
oped nations are called upon to give up trading concessions to enter the
market of an importing nation that can and will not reciprocate, yet
wants to be given the benefit of unconditional MFN treatment in negoti-
ating a concession with a third party. At the heart of the souring, then, is
the realization that when all players do not have equal or equivalent abil-
ities to trade, some players may have to give more than they get or more
than they want to give just to stay in the game of liberalized trading.
69
In turn, the souring on economic liberalism has led to a re-evalua-
tion of the goals of political liberalism and multilateralism. Economic
and political integration is, and has been for the last decade, a process of
creating geographical trade regions. Regional trading partners, who act
as principal suppliers to each other, keep whatever benefits that exist in
liberalizing trade in that region to themselves. Regional integration has
been adopted by both developed and developing countries70 alike. Be-
cause of the rise of protectionism and the pervasiveness of regionalism,
some economists no longer see the GATT as being effective in promoting
the myths of free or liberalized trade.71
for a Latin American free-trade zone during the Fall 1990, as well as the Administration's assur-
ances that it would not bargain away either the Super § 301 or U.S. antidumping and antisubsidy
trade laws. ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at 92; INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 16, 1990, at 19.
See The GATT's Last Gasp, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 1990, at 16 (exhorting the U.S. to give up on its
protectionist behavior in the Uruguay Round with respect to the area of trade in services and to
adopt a negotiating plan that is consistent with GATT principles); see also Fin. Times, Oct. 24, 1990,
at 14, col. 1 (declaring that the U.S. approach to trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round for the
services area is fraught with self-interest and protectionism and that, as a world economic leader, the
U.S. approach to trade negotiations is doing a disservice to the GATT principle of unconditional
MFN, which it ought to be upholding); The GA7T in Peril, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 14.
(questioning whether America should let the Uruguay Round fail).
68. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions, supra note 37, at 94.
69. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 53, at 496-498; Curtis, supra note 53, at 401.
70. See Fin. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at 5, col. 3 (discussing Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari's push for trilateral negotiations with the U.S. and Canada to be included in a three way free
trade agreement); see J. COMM. INT'L ED. SPECIAL REPORT, Oct. 29, 1990; J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 10,
1990, at 4, col. 3 (discussing the plans that Brazil and Argentina, the two largest economies in South
America, for creating a bilateral free trade zone that may eventually include Uruguay and Para-
guay); see Fin. Times, Sept. 28, 1990, at 2, col. I (discussing that the EC seeks a free trade agreement
with the Gulf states as a way to strengthen EC-Gulf relations following in the wake of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait); see J. COMm. INT'L ED. SPECIAL REPORT, Oct. 29, 1990, (discussing that
Japan might join in a free trade zone with the U.S. in order to "meet the challenge of proliferating
free trade zones throughout the world").
71. See Thurow, GATT is Dead, Sept. 1990 J. oF ACCr. 36 for an argument about the relevancy
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Several reasons account for the GATT's ineffectiveness to inhibit
regionalism. Some believe that because the GATT has huge institutional
weaknesses, such as a cumbersome amending process, a negotiating strat-
egy that caters to major interests, and a weak dispute settlement process
that prefers consultation at the expense of applying needed sanctions
against transgressors, and because it is still provisional in domestic legal
systems, members with trading interests in common go outside the
GATT to conclude side agreements that give better returns on trading
than would a multilateral GAIT agreement.72 Others fear that if re-
gional interest caused the UR to meet with failure, this would confirm a
fear that the GATT is dead, and herald a return to trading wars like
those during the 1930s which exacerbated the Great Depression. 3
That rampant regionalism, in the wake of the Brussels impasse, will
result in the demise of the GATT or in trading wars seems hyperbolic.
What seems clear is that the Brussels impasse spells the end of an era of
idealism about "letting the market decide" a member's comparative ad-
vantage and the start of new era of realism that acknowledges that
GATT members liberalize their trade with each other because that is the
most efficient process for promoting their own selfish interests; likewise,
that they act in a protectionist fashion for the same reasons. What is also
needed to maintain the GATT as a world trade treaty with the potential
for fostering liberalized trade agreements is to stop the mythologizing
about what the goals of trade liberalization should be. What is needed is
a realization of what the goals of trade liberalization are in practice; that
strong GATT norms such as reciprocity, non-discrimination and devel-
opment work to counterbalance competing trade interests; and that this
counterbalancing fosters liberalized trade agreements that act simultane-
ously to open a member's market while attempting to protect a member's
advantage.
of the GATT as a world trade treaty that stresses open, unmanaged trade. His argument consists of
several points: First, no major trading power is "prepared to make the necessary changes" to coordi-
nate its monetary and fiscal policy with that of other major trading powers so as to produce a level
playing field for trade, nor will they "yield economic sovereignty." Id. at 36. Second, "it is far better
to accept the reality of trading blocs and get on with the job of understanding how trade between the
blocs could be managed so that it doesn't deteriorate into the" trade wars of the 1930s. Third, "the
existing rules of the GATT need to be replaced by a set of rules governing what is and is not permis-
sible in managing bloc trade." Fourth, even though the GATT as a trade treaty will be propped up
diplomatically if the Uruguay Round fails, the "time has come to build up a new world economy
based on today's realities." Id. at 39.
72. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions, supra note 37, at 96.
73. Schott, The Global Trade Negotiations: What can beAchieved, 29 INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 1,
5-8 (September 1990).
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3.0 THE URUGUAY ROUND
Periods during which negotiation takes place to formulate reduc-
tions in trade barriers under the auspices of the GATT Agreement, as
well as to emend the articles of the Agreement, are called Rounds.74 The
most recent negotiating period conference was the Uruguay Round held
at the GATT headquarters in Geneva,75 and originally scheduled to last
from the end of 1986 to the end of 1990. Its agenda was the most ambi-
tious of any other round,7 6 attempting to place the heavily subsidized
trade of farm products and textiles within the scope of the Agreement."
74. The word Round connotes that the process of liberalizing trade resembles a fight. Cf.
Strange, supra note 8, at 235-245 (discussing how and why economic liberalism has persisted as an
ideology that justifies liberalized trading because it is grounded in the concept of efficiency and
competition. Big business uses liberalism to condemn politicians' choices to pursue national interests
as inefficient and irrational when it is closed out from competing as freely as it desires in a particular
market.) Some of the other words in the lexicon for liberalizing trade arguably indicate that the
process is perceived as a fight (although this perception also applies to the general process of negotia-
tion). For example, the offers that GATT members make to each other to reduce trade barriers are
called "concessions." Members concede to reduce a tariff after first "binding" it. See supra note 56
for the definition of a tariff binding.
75. This building is the William Rappard Centre on the Rue de Lausanne, across the street from
the Botanical Garden and about three-quarters of a mile from the Palais des Nations, the UN Build-
ing. The Rappard Centre is situated within a grassy park area that has a bicycle and jogging path
and looks out onto Lake Geneva. The Centre used to be the headquarters of the International Labor
Organization. Now the GATT shares the building with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The two halves of the centre are clearly demarcated: on the GATT side, the hallways
are carpeted and uncluttered, the offices have very moderm equipment and furniture, and there are
small lounge areas with leather armchairs on most floors. On the UNHCR side, the hallways are
noisy, linoleumed, poorly lit and often lined with boxes of old reports. The GATE side looks very
much like a new office building, whereas the UNHCR side looks like an old town hall.
76. Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 1; US. Mission Daily Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1990, Ge-
neva:EUR 318 (quoting Carla Hills, the U.S.T.R. saying that the Uruguay Trade Round must be
ambitious); Schott, supra note 73, at 1-3; Hufbauer and Schott, supra note 13, at 14.
77. In the past these areas had proved difficult to bring into the GATT. For example, the previ-
ous negotiating round, the Tokyo Round, was scheduled to last only two years from 1973 to 1975
but lasted until 1979. ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 71. Agriculture was one of the main areas
holding it up.
Two consultative agreements on agriculture resulted from the Tokyo Round: the International
Dairy Arrangement, Apr. 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.5, reprinted in GATT, 26 B.I.S.D.
91-115, covering certain milk and dairy products; and the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat,
Apr. 12, 1979, MTN/ME/8, reprinted in GATT, 26 B.I.S.D. 84-90, covering beef and veal products.
Adamantopoulos, Multilateral Agreements Concluded in the Framework of GA7T, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE 107, 112-113 (2nd ed. 1990). These agreements "primarily
provided forums for resolving trade disputes over meat and dairy products rather than establishing
prices." Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade
Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. IN'L L.J. 123, 144.
In 1974, the MultiFiber Arrangement (Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
Dec. 20, 1973, T.I.A.S. 7840, reprinted in 21S B.I.S.D. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1974) [hereinafter
the MFA], was originally negotiated as a temporary derogation from GATE rules to regulate textiles
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In addition, the agenda included such perennially difficult-to-negotiate
areas as GATT dispute resolution procedures and safeguards. It also
included several areas never discussed before at a GATT round, such as
the complicated and complex area of services, an umbrella term covering
such diverse areas as maritime transport, tourism and telecommunica-
tions, and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and trade-related
intellectual property (TRIPS).
78
and clothing trade among all of its forty plus signatories, developed and developing countries alike.
(The EC is considered one signatory). Silberston, The MFA and its Alternatives, TEXTILE OUTLOOK
INT'L, January 1986, at 31-32; Wolf, Time to Plan an End to the MFA, TEXTILE OUTLOOK INT'L,
September 1985, at 33. In practice, however the MFA only regulates exports from Eastern Euro-
pean and developing countries destined for industrialized markets, although that accounts for half of
the world's exports. Subhan, The Fourth Multi-Fibre Arrangement, TEXTILE OUTLOOK INT'L, Sep-
tember 1986, at 22-23. The MFA has been renewed three times, in 1978, 1982 and 1986. Id. (These
are: Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles of 1977, re-
printed in 24 B.I.S.D. 5 [hereinafter MFA II]; Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding In-
ternational Trade in Textiles of 1981, reprinted in 28 B.I.S.D. 3 [hereinafter MFA III] and Protocol
Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles of 1986, reprinted in 33
B.I.S.D. 7 [hereinafter MFA IV]. MFA IV was extended until July 31, 1991. Id.
The problems with the MFA include that it does not cover all textile products and that it is not a
transparent agreement. Under the MFA, an importing country can invite an exporter to set up a
bilateral agreement whereby the exporter restricts exports of particular products. Without such an
agreement, the importer can impose unilateral sanctions selectively against that one exporter. Steele,
The MFA and Beyond: The EC Perspective, TEXTILE OUTLOOK INT'L, May 1990, at 53, 54.
Because textiles are considered to be very important to developing countries, and because the U.S.
has argued for strong protectionism against developing countries' products, liberalizing the MFA
and integrating it into the GAIT will require the strengthening of GAIT safeguards, especially
Article 19. This will stop developed countries from imposing quota actions selectively against one
importer in order to reduce a potential increase in imports. (Article 19 sanctions can not discrimi-
nate against one country, but must be applied to all). Id. at 55-56.
78. Highlighting the difficult issues in each of these new areas is beyond the scope of this paper.
For a review of the issues in the dispute settlement area during the Uruguay Round, see Petersmann,
supra note 40, and Ivo Van Bael, The GA 2T"Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 67
(1988); for safeguards, see P. Kleen, supra note 28, and Poloeuktov and Sergio Delgado, Safeguards;
Issues in the Uruguay Round in URUGUAY ROUND: PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 45 (UNCTAD/
ITP/10 (1989)); for services, see Lazar, Service and the GA77 US. Motives and a Blueprint for
Negotiations, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 135 (1990); Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of Services: Implications
for a GAT Agreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 125 (1989); Comment, A Rainy Day for the GAT
Umbrella: Trade Negotiations on Services, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 121 (1989); Nayyar,
Some Reflections on the Uruguay Round and Trade in Services, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1988);
Gibbs & Mashayekhi, Servicer Cooperation for Development, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 81 (1988); see
generally UNCTAD, TRADE IN SERVICES: SECTORAL ISSUES UNCTAD/ITP/26 (1989);
UNCTAD, SERVICES AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS TD/B/1008/Rev. 1 (1985); for a tie-in
between services and TRIPS and TRIMS, see Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and
Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987); for
TRIPS, see VanGrasstek Communications, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: United States
Trade Policy, Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND: FURTHER PA-
PERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 79 UNCTAD/ITP/42 (1990); Bifani, Intellectual Property Rights and
International Trade in URUGUAY ROUND: PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 129 (UNCTAD/ITP/10
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The UR agenda was ambitious because diverse interests and needs
had shaped it. The developed nations, especially the U.S., wanted to talk
services because they perceived they had the edge in this area and wanted
access to the developing world's untapped markets. The developing na-
tions wanted to talk agriculture, an area which had been left undone by
the previous Tokyo Round, as well as textiles because they perceived
they had an advantage in these areas. Many, especially the GATT staff,
wanted negotiations on dispute settlement, safeguards, and subsidies be-
cause of the increasingly protectionist practices that had cropped up
since the Tokyo Round to bypass the stronger enforcement mechanisms
instituted during that round.
3.1 History of Previous Rounds
To understand the origins of the UR, it is necessary to examine a
brief history of the seven previous GAIT rounds. These were in order:
Geneva 194-7, Annecy (France) 1949, Torquay (England) 1951, Geneva
1956, Dillon (in Geneva) 1960-62, Kennedy (in Geneva) 1962-67, and
Tokyo (in Geneva) in 1973-79. The first five rounds worked on reducing
tariff rates using the method of product-by-product negotiation. 79 The
first Geneva Round was the original session where the GATT was
drafted, whereas the Annecy and the Torquay, while resulting in small
tariff reductions, were more involved with accessional negotiations of
new members to the GATT."° The next two rounds, the Geneva and the
Dillon, followed along the lines of the earlier rounds in reducing tariffs.8"
The sixth round, the Kennedy, saw a major change of negotiating
technique because, as more and more individual products were consid-
ered eligible for tariff reduction, it was increasingly more cumbersome
and time consuming to negotiate concessions for each individual prod-
uct. 2 The negotiating technique adopted during the Kennedy Round
(1989)); for TRIMS, see Puri and Bondad, TRIMS Development Aspects and the General Agree-
ment, in URUGUAY ROUND: FURTHER PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 55 UNCTAD/ITP/42
(1990); de C. Grey, "1992" TRIMS and the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND: FURTHER
PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 237 UNCTAD/ITP/42 (1990).
79. G.P. Casadio, Multilateral Negotiations in the GAIT Framework, An Analysis of Trade
Policy Changes Through Various GATT Rounds (unpublished paper), Dipartimento Di Scienze
Economiche, Universita degli Bologna (1987) (available in the GATT library).
80. Morrison, GAIT's Seven Rounds of Trade Talks Span More than Thirty Years, Bus. AM.
July 7, 1986, at 8-9.
81. Id. at 8.
82. For example, the tariffs on 8,700 products had been negotiated in the Torquay Round alone.
Id. at 9.
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was a mixture of a linear-reduction strategy 3 and the product-by-prod-
uct method. Called the French plan, this technique reduced the tariffs on
a class of products but specified a time-limit on tariff reductions. This
method helped make the Kennedy Round quite successful inasmuch as
members exchanged tariff concessions for approximately $40 billion of
world trade.84 Also, the Kennedy Round saw the first attempts at reduc-
ing nontariff barriers (NTB's), and resulted in the first agreements on
anti-dumping practices and customs valuation.8 5
The Tokyo Round from 1973-1979 also reduced tariffs on previ-
ously-negotiated goods by the linear-reduction method.8 6 However,
some goods, such as agricultural products, continued to be negotiated
bilaterally on a product-by-product basis.8 7 The Tokyo Round is signifi-
cant not for tariff reductions, but for the six major agreements called
Codes that reduced nontariff barriers.88 These Codes were not added to
the Agreement but stand separate from it; each code applies only to those
83. Linear reduction is simply the reduction of all tariffs for a certain class of products by a
uniform percentage. Casadio, supra note 79, at 61.
84. Morrison, supra note 80, at 10.
85. Casadio, supra note 79, at 62.
86. During the Tokyo Round, members reduced tariffs using the so-called Swiss formula, which
proportionately lowered the highest tariffs by the greatest percentage and consequently harmonized
tariff schedules on diverse goods to be more uniform and at a lower rate. Morrison, supra note 80, at
10.
87. Agricultural liberalization of nontariff barriers held up and was not accomplished in the
Tokyo Round.
88. The major Tokyo Round agreements include:
1) a customs valuation code (also called the Agreement on the interpretation of Article 7 GATT),
which, by adopting the transaction value as the worth of the good, removes a government- or admin-
istrative agency-set worth that was inflated solely for the purpose of collecting a higher duty;
2) a government procurement code, which requires more transparent laws, regulations and practices
on governments' buying of goods and services and makes bidding by domestic and foreign firms
more competitive;
3) an import-licensing code, which requires more openness in published rules for getting license
needed to conduct business;
4) a subsidies and countervailing-duty code, which prohibits the use of domestic subsidies to harm
trading interests of importers and prohibits countervailing duties from being used to unjustifiably
impede international trade;
5) a technical barriers to trade code (the Standards Code);
6) and finally, a civil aircraft agreement, which liberalized trade in this area by getting rid of tariffs
and some NTBs on civil aircraft and parts. Casadio, supra note 79, at 35.
Other Tokyo Round agreements include:
7) the Geneva (1979) Protocol to the GATT and the Supplementary Protocol, containing new
schedules to GATT for 37 countries or areas;
8) the new anti-dumping code (also called the agreement on implementation of Article 6 GATT);
9) the arrangement regarding bovine meat;
10) the International Dairy Arrangement. Adamantopoulos, supra note 77, at 108-109.
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members that agree to be bound by it. 9
The reason why extra GATT Codes resulted from the Tokyo Round
stems from the strong norm that all of the trade agreements during a
round form a single package which is then accepted or rejected in toto.9°
Individual agreements from a round are not accepted in a piecemeal fash-
ion. Thus, members' consent to the package of agreements that came out
of the Tokyo Round meant that the whole package became part of the
GATT, which in turn bound members to all of these agreements. How-
ever, the Codes were negotiated as subsidiary to the GATT because they
represented settlements on difficult-to-negotiate and protected trade ar-
eas on which members had not fully agreed to liberalize. Since there was
no bona fide consensus on applying unconditional MFN treatment to the
nontariff barriers dealt with in the Codes, members had the option to
bind themselves to the Codes.91
Similarly, in the UR, negotiations on goods (as opposed to services)
were expected to result in a package of agreements that would become
part of the GATT. Members would have to accept all fourteen goods
agreements in order for the Round to produce a concrete result. Funda-
mentally, the reason why the UR produced no concrete results is because
not all members could accept the agreement in agriculture, a goods area.
3.2 Launching the Uruguay Round
When the trade ministers of the GATT contracting parties met at
the Atlantic seaside resort at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on September 20,
1986, and unanimously adopted a declaration92 stating the principles,
objectives and agenda of a new trade conference, they launched the UR.
The immediate origins of the Round went back four years before to a bi-
annual GATT ministerial meeting in 1982 at which the U.S. pushed hard
89. Adamantopoulos, supra note 77, at 109. The legal status of the Tokyo Round Agreements
within the GATT is problematic because they are based on reciprocity and not on unconditional
MFN. In other words, a non-signatory to any one of the Tokyo Codes can not invoke an infraction
of that code even against a signatory to it. Consequently, because not all contracting parties have
signed all of the Tokyo Round Codes, a GAT member has a unique set of GAIT obligations to
each other member, depending on which codes any two members have signed. The U.S. has bound
itself to all six codes; therefore, only those members who have also signed all six codes may invoke
Codes obligations in a dispute against the U.S. Id. at 109-110.
90. See generally Casadio, supra note 79.
91. Adamantopoulos, supra note 77, at 109-110.
92. Ministerial Declaration of September 20, 1986 on the Uruguay Round (MIN(86/6), re-
printed in GAIT, GAT AcTIvmEs 1986: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE GAIT
15-30 (1987) [hereinafter GAIT AcrivmEs 1986].
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for another round of trade talks that would include services.93 Serious
preparation started in November 1985 when the Contracting Parties at
their annual session established a preparatory committee (Prepcom) to
review what the goals and substance of a new conference ought to be.94
Prepcom recommended an agenda that would closely follow the
problems discussed in the 1982 ministerial meeting, and the agenda in
the Punta del Este Declaration closely follows the Prepcom agenda.95
The text of the Punta Del Este Declaration emphasizes a holistic
view of the economic environment and strives to create a stable, liberal-
ized link between trade, money, finance and development. Overall, the
Declaration has four main goals: to liberalize trade in many traditional
areas of particular concern to the developing world; to make the Agree-
ment more responsive to new issues in the trade of goods; to strengthen
safeguards against restrictive trade measures; and to create a framework
for the trade of services. 96
The Declaration is divided into two parts: Part One, on the goals for
the negotiations on trade in goods, and Part Two, on the goals for negoti-
ating services trade. Specifically, Part One required that there be a stand-
still and rollback of any protectionist trade measures inconsistent with
the Agreement for the duration of the Round. 97 Part One also identified
the fourteen areas of trade in goods to be negotiated: tariffs, non-tariff
measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles
and clothing, agriculture, including sanitary and phytosanitary regula-
tions, existing GATT articles, safeguards, Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tion (MTN) Agreements and Arrangements,9" subsidies and
93. The Americans perceived an advantage in that area because they believed their full-blown
industry would dominate in exploiting the new markets of the developing world. U.S.TR, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM,
1984-85, Appendix M: U.S. Goals for Trade in Services; Randhawa, Punta delEste and After: Nego-
tiations on Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round, 21 J. WORLD TRADE 163, 167-168 (1987).
In 1982, when the GATT ministerial meeting was held to determine a preliminary agenda for a
new round of trade talks, it was estimated that, in the United States, the services sector accounted
for the employment of 7 out of 10 working Americans and for about 65% of the U.S. gross national
product. Comment, Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GAYT to Include Trade in Services, 7
INT'L TRADE L.J. 281, 282 (1982-83) (citing U.S.T.R., U.S. DOMESTIC STRATEGY FOR SERVICES
TRADE (July 9, 1982)).
94. GATT ACTIVITIES 1986, supra note 92, at 6.
95. Id. at 5-7.
96. Id. at 11-12.
97. Rollback and standstill provisions ensure that during the Uruguay Round no member could
bully its trade interests into becoming top priorities by applying GATT-illegal protections and then
"negotiating" to give these up so long as certain trade concessions it desired were promised.
98. These are the Tokyo Round Codes, except for the Subsidies code. See supra note 88.
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countervailing duty measures,99 dispute settlement, trade-related aspects
of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), including trade in counterfeit
goods, and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS).
Moreover, Part One created the organization responsible for negoti-
ating agreements on goods, called the Group of Negotiation on Goods
(GNG). The GNG set up individual negotiating groups for each of the
fourteen trade areas as well as the negotiating agendas of these groups.
Examples of the individual groups are the Negotiating Group on Agri-
culture (NGAgri) and the Negotiating Group on Textiles (NGTextiles).
The negotiating groups were to report to the GNG and, in turn, the
GNG was to report to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), which
oversees the conduct of the entire Round. The TNC is comprised of all
the senior negotiating officials from each member's delegation for all
trade areas, who have the political authority to make offers and conces-
sions when the negotiations get bogged down and to change their
position.
Trade ministers and top GATT officials participated in selecting
chairmen for each of the negotiating groups. Arthur Dunkel, Director-
General of the GATT, was named Chairman of the GNG and two chair-
men were named to head the TNC. The Uruguayan trade minister was
made chairman for the occasions when the TNC would meet at the min-
isterial level, and Dunkel was also named chairman of the TNC when it
would meet at the officials level.100
Part Two of the Declaration placed the negotiations on services
under a separate group, the Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS),
which also reported to the TNC. However, the GNS was "to respect the
policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying to services,"
which implies that any services agreement resulting from the Round
need not heed to the multilateralism norm of the GATT and that such an
agreement was not intended by the ministers to be included within the
99. Articles 6 & 16 and the Subsidies Code would be reviewed.
100. Ministerial level means a meeting of the Trade Ministers of GATT members. Officials
level means a meeting of the senior negotiators from all delegations who have the political authority
from the Trade Ministers to alter offers, make proposals, bargain away points and concede. The
dual chairmanship of the TNC was a matter of diplomatic etiquette, only a trade minister ought to
chair a meeting of other trade ministers, and pragmatism, TNC meetings at the officials level were
where most of the deals were struck, whereas at TNC meetings at the ministerial level, the deals
were accepted.
In theory, having the GATT Director-General chair the TNC at the level of officials meant that if
negotiations got bogged down, the GATT staff could call a TNC meeting to get officials to take
political decisions and to seek compromises, thereby keeping the negotiations moving.
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3.3 Agricultural Policies of the EC and the U.S.
To better understand the agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay
Round, the following description highlights the cornerstones of the agri-
cultural policies of the EC and the U.S. that were to be liberalized in the
negotiations.
3.3.1 EC Agricultural Policy. The EC's farm aid program is car-
ried out through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 102 The CAP
has five goals: "(1) to increase farm productivity; (2) to ensure a fair
standard of living for farmers; (3) to stabilize agricultural markets; (4) to
assure the availability of supplies; and (5) to maintain reasonable prices
for consumers."' 0 3 There exist three procedures for achieving these
goals: (1) "common prices for agricultural products in all member coun-
tries"; (2) "an absolute preference for EC producers over outside produ-
cers, and" (3) "common funding of its agricultural programs through the
EC Commission in Brussels."'1 4
The CAP works this way: a common price for the same farm prod-
uct in all EC countries is achieved by the EC Council of Farm Ministers
setting each year a target price as well an intervention price for all pro-
tected farm products. 05 These products include cereals, grains plus feed
products, meat, poultry, eggs, milk products, fruits and vegetables, wine,
tobacco and fishery products."°6 The target price is that price which EC
farmers must get for a product; the intervention price is that price at
which each EC member state is bound to purchase EC farm commodi-
ties. If the prices of non-EC food imports are lower than the established
target price, a variable levy is tacked onto the import's cost. 10 7 Thus, the
101. As there was no mandate in the Punta del Este Declaration that the services agreement had
to be concluded within the four comers of the GATT, members expected that the services agreement
would be separate from the GATT and would result in a General Agreement on Services. See
Nayyar, supra note 78, at 35.
102. See generally A Common Agricultural Policy for the 1990s, EUR. Doe. PERIODICAL 5/1989
(1989) (a very pro-CAP, and not surprisingly, anti-U.S. farm policies brochure that gives an honest
look at the EC farm aid program but glosses over the Uruguay Round's Midterm Declarations goals
for farm trade liberalization (See infra note 142 and accompanying text).
103. Filipek, supra note 77, at 132-133.
104. Hathaway, Agriculture and the GATT Rewriting the Rules, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. No.
20, at 72 (September 1987).
105. Filipek, supra note 77, at 132.
106. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 76-77.
107. Filipek, supra note 77, at 133.
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
variable levy acts like an import quota and as a barrier to the EC
market.
108
When EC farmers export their products, the EC pays them export
subsidies to match the difference in price between world market prices
and the inflated internal target price.109 The EC farmer is insulated from
the rise and fall of world prices for agricultural products. It is no wonder
that the EC production has continued to increase as world demand has
fallen110 and that the rise in the cost of CAP is bankrupting the EC.11
3.3.2 U.S. Agricultural Policy. Unlike the CAP, which began in
the 1960s, 112 the U.S.'s farm program began during the Great Depression
of the 1930s and its three fundamental tenets still persist. 1 3 These are:
(1) price supports, "whereby the government stands ready to make non-
recourse loans to eligible farmers for crops at a specified minimum
price";" 4 (2) "production controls on basic crops," such as wheat, corn,
cotton, rice, peanuts and tobacco, that pay farmers for reducing their
harvested acreage of these crops; and (3) "deficiency payments to make
up difference between the market price and some 'target' price deter-
mined to be desirable[;] [t]here has never been any permanent direct mar-
ket intervention for beef, pork, or poultry, nor for minor field crops, fruit,
or vegetables."' 1 5
In 1985, due to a dramatic fall in the world market of the prices of
U.S. food imports, export subsidies for major crops, especially for cereals
and grains, were added to the program as target prices and deficiency
payments were to be phased out. In 1987, more export subsidies were
added." 6 U.S. federal budget costs for farm price and income support
rose "sixfold between 1982 and 1986,"l1 just as the Uruguay Round was
coalescing.
108. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 73.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See infra note 306.
112. The CAP was created by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I1 (Treaty of Rome).
113. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 81.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 83-84.
117. Id. at 84
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3.4 The First Three Years
3.4.1 1987. Negotiating sessions for the fifteen groups began in
February 1987.118 During that year the Negotiating Group on Agricul-
ture (NGAgri) met five times.119 Proposals were tabled first by the
U.S., 120 then by the European Community (EC), the Cairns Group,121
and Canada,122 followed by the Nordic Countries,123 a coalition of Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and Japan.
The U.S. proposal2  called for the long-term irreversible elimina-
tion over ten years of most governmental assistance to agriculture includ-
ing: a ten year phase out of both internal support and export subsidies; a
conversion of import barriers into tariffs, which would then be reduced
over ten years; 125 and immediate action on health and sanitary regula-
tions that blocked market access. Rather than negotiating specific reduc-
tions for various kinds of support, the reduction of subsidies would be
accomplished by lowering an aggregate measure of support (AMS) by an
annual percentage, that is, an average of total government aid such as
domestic price supports, subsidies on exports and quotas on imports.
The EC's first proposal 26 was less detailed than that of the U.S.'s,
and did little more than state a general world view and position on farm
trade liberalization. It also highlighted the difference between the U.S.
and the EC in their goals for liberalizing farm trade. Only short-term,
reversible reductions were presented, with long-term reductions to be ne-
118. See Information Service of the GAIT, NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, No. 1 (March 16, 1987) [hereinafter NEws OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND].
119. See NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 1, at 2/3 (March 16, 1987); NEWS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, No. 4, at 2/3-4 (May 22, 1987); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 7, at 4
(July 14, 1987); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 11, at 2/3 (Nov. 12, 1987); NEWS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, No. 13, at 5 (Dec. 21, 1987).
120. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 7, at 4 (July 14, 1987).
121. A coalition of developed and developing agricultural exporting countries formed in the
summer of 1986 at a meeting of these countries' trade ministers at Cairns, Australia for the purpose
of representing exporters' interests in the UR. Included were Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and
Uruguay. For a more detailed description of the Cairns Group, see infra note 293 and accompany-
ing text.
122. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND No. 11, at 2/3-4 (Nov. 12, 1987); Canada's individual
proposal will not be reviewed.
123. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND No. 13, at 6 (Dec. 21, 1987).
124. See GATT AcmrvrrEs 1987 at 30-32 (1989); NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND No. 7, at 4
(July 14, 1987).
125. This process is called tariffication.
126. GATT Acnvmn s 1987 at 30-32 (1988); NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 11, at
2/3-4 (Nov. 12, 1987).
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gotiated at a later phase in the Round. It was more of a "Let's go slow
and see what minor changes do first" proposal compared to the Amer-
can demand of "Let's change it all now."
The Cairns group proposal' 27 was similar in philosophy to that of
the U.S. in that it aimed for full liberalization, but it also called for short-
term relief measures, such as freezes on import quotas and short-term
cuts to subsidies. This proposal also sought the tariffication of import
access barriers and the elimination of subsidies by calculating aggregate
measures of support for each country, which are then progressively
phased. Some members complained that the Nordic proposal concen-
trated too heavily on reducing price supports and subsidies for agricul-
tural products and not enough on reducing import access restrictions.1
2 8
Japan's proposal'29 focused on creating stability in agricultural prices
and food security within its borders, especially for basic foodstuffs, par-
ticularly rice and beef. Restrictions on foods imported to Japan were to
be negotiated on essentially a bilateral basis, by each trading partner ne-
gotiating its own tariff concessions for access to Japan's consumers.
Thus, Japan was choosing a give-to-get posture of reciprocity instead of
an unconditional MFN treatment on imported food. This proposal was
criticized as being overcautious, and not nearly ambitious (read that lib-
eralizing) enough. In hindsight it can be seen that by the end of 1987,
the major players in the Round with respect to agriculture had already
revealed the degree of liberalization they wanted in agricultural trade.
3.4.2 1988. In 1988 there were seven meetings of the NGAgri. 30
Many of the same themes from the previous proposals were repeated in
those issued in 1988. For example, at the June meeting of the NGAgri,
the U.S. and the EC each issued papers.13 1 The EC was still talking
about short-term reductions, specifying freezing support on cereals, oil-
seeds, beef/veal and dairy products at 1984 levels until a long-term
agreement, if any, could be reached.' 32 The U.S. argued that protection-
ism for the sake of food security was not the same as that for self-suffi-
127. See sources cited supra note 126.
128. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 13, at 5 (Dec. 21, 1987).
129. GATT AcTIvrIES 1986, supra note 92, at 32.
130. See NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 14, at 5 (Feb. 26, 1988); NEWS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, No. 16, at 2/3 (May 31, 1988); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 17, at 6 (June
30, 1988); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 18, at 9-11 (Aug. 2, 1988); NEWS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, No. 19, at 2/3-4 (Oct. 5, 1988); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 20, at 6-8
(Nov. 4, 1988); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND No. 21, at 1-4 (Nov. 30, 1988).
131. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 17, at 6-7 (June 30, 1988).
132. Id.
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ciency and proposed removing Article 11:2(a) from the Agreement,
which allows members to prohibit exports of agricultural food products
to relieve critical shortage.133 The Cairns Group, ever pragmatic, pro-
posed a framework for initializing liberalization: an immediate freeze on
support and subsidies plus reduction of support for the next two years by
ten per cent each year.
134
Throughout 1988, developing importers offered proposals135 that
differed from those of the major players. In October 1988, the U.S. and
the EC each tabled proposals for the trade ministers to consider for adop-
tion as the Midterm agreement in agriculture.136 For the second time,
the U.S. wanted long-term reduction of farm aid, including the EC's vari-
able levy by tariffication. As the EC was generally not in favor of tariffi-
cation, the EC wanted the trade ministers to accept that long-term
reduction of farm aid be done by calculating an aggregate measure of
support and then reducing that figure.
137
A TNC meeting at the ministerial level took place in Montreal from
December 5-9, 1988, during which trade ministers undertook a midterm
review of the Round results. 13  However, as a presage to the impasse
that occurred in Brussels at the end of the UR, trade ministers could not
agree to a Midterm Declaration at the December 1988 Ministerial meet-
ing. The meeting experienced an impasse for four months until agree-
ment could be achieved in the four areas of agriculture, textiles and
clothing, safeguards and trips. Not until April 1989 at the next TNC
133. Id.
134. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY RouND, No. 18, at 9 (Aug. 2, 1988).
135. India's proposal stated that direct government action in agriculture was legitimate for de-
veloping countries, that tariffs and quotas must be reduced on a voluntary, not unconditional MFN
basis, and that export subsidies would be reduced only if consistent with the developing countries'
competitive needs. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 21, at 1 (Nov. 30, 1988).
Jamaica's proposal set out the general philosophy of the least developing countries with respect to
agriculture. NEws OF THE URUGUAY RoUND, No. 18, at 9 (Aug. 2, 1988). A joint proposal from
Egypt, Peru and others specified zero tariffs in agriculture. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No.
19, at 2 (Oct. 5, 1988).
Korea, a newly industrialized country, aligned itself with Japan in proposing that security of basic
food products for self-sufficiency reasons justified not liberalizing trade in rice and other basic foods.
GATT AcrlvmEs 1988 (1989) at 36-37; NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 20, at 6-7 (Nov. 4,
1988).
136. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 20, at 7-8 (Nov. 4, 1988).
137. Id. An aggregate measure of support lumps all supports-internal price supports and ex-
port subsidies-together. Another method is to negotiate to reduce specific supports by an annual
percentage. The U.S. has increasingly grown against an AMS approach because it does not guaran-
tee reduction of export subsidies, which the U.S. regarded as crucial to any agricultural reform
package.
138. GAIT AcTrvrrms 1988 (1989) at 22-25.
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meeting (held at the official level), and after several months of intense
informal negotiating sessions, was a Midterm Declaration concluded.
1 39
The Declaration was comprised of preliminary agreements made in a few
of the negotiating areas and other texts, affirming the progress made in
all of the fifteen areas to date and prescribing a path for the negotiators to
follow in all of these areas until the end of the Round."4
The midterm impasse in agriculture occurred because there was no
agreement on how to liberalize farm trade in the long term; whether to
reduce by tariffication, or by using an AMS, whether to reduce all kinds
of farm aid or only internal price support.1 41 The midterm review text
that was eventually adopted for agriculture was little more than a decla-
ration that progressive reduction of farm support was the goal of the
negotiations and that either calculating an AMS or negotiating reduc-
tions on specific kinds of support could accomplish reduction. 142 Fur-
ther, the Declaration clarified some of the confusion inherent in the
previous two years by identifying three kinds of agricultural support that
could be reduced: restrictions on imports (also called border protection
measures); subsidies and export competition (this category includes inter-
nal domestic support, such as price supports, as well as export subsidies);
and export prohibitions.
143
At the end of two years of negotiation, no real political decisions
were taken either by the Trade Ministers or at the officials level to create
a working compromise proposal. Also, after two years, there was no real
movement in any of the major players' positions on how farm trade
should be liberalized. The central issue impeding progress was not how
to make farm trade nondiscriminatory, as the negotiations had not
progressed that far. The more fundamental central issue was how to re-
duce rampant protectionism on farm products. The fundamental enter-
prise, then, in the agricultural negotiations of the UR, was the creation of
a reciprocity arrangement in which all of the major players, the EC, the
139. Id.
140. For the full text of the Uruguay Round Midterm Agreement, see GATT, Focus NEws-
LETTER No. 61 (May 1989) [hereinafter GATT, Focus].
141. GATT AcTrnivrs 1988 (1989) at 34.
142. GATT MTN.TNC/1l (MIN) (April 21, 1989), reprinted in NEWS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, No. 27 (April 24, 1989).
143. Id. at 9-13. As it turned out, border protection measures, subsidies and export competition
were the subjects of final two years of negotiations. Export prohibitions were considered but did not
become an important issue in the next two years.
Also agreed to in the Midterm Declaration were some short-term measures: a freeze on current
internal and export support and on border protection measure plus harmonization of national regu-
lations on health and sanitary regulations placed on imports for the duration of the Round. Id. at 12.
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Cairns Group and the U.S., would perceive that the farm trade support
that they were giving up would result in an increase in their farm trade.
3.4.3 1989. As a result of the impasse in the midterm agreement,
there were no new negotiations or proposals in agriculture until July
1989.1" The Round had effectively lost six months because of the
midterm impasse. This created a sense of urgency that was subsequently
reflected in the increasing polarization and lack of compromise in the
positions of the major players, and in the increasing specificity of the
communications and proposals tabled. After the midterm review, the
negotiations became sophisticated and complex.
In July 1989, both the EC and the U.S. issued communications that
contained language that would become buzzwords for their respective
positions.1 41 The EC focused on reducing both domestic and export
assistance exclusively by using an aggregate measure of support and not
by negotiating specific policy reductions.'" The U.S. communication fo-
cused on border protection by tariffication. The U.S. provided a formula
for reducing converted tariffs and argued that tarilfication was market
stabilizing and revenue generating. Although at this point in the negotia-
tions, the U.S. still considered tariffication and using an aggregate mea-
sure of support, and complementary approaches to long-term reduction
of farm support, the U.S. doubted that the variable levy could be effec-
tively converted into a tariff or calculated into an aggregate measure of
support. The U.S. began to believe that the variable levy could not be
effectively phased out or reduced by any method, but had to be disman-
tled in one fell swoop. 47 From this point on, the story of the Round
negotiations in agriculture is about the U.S. and the EC growing increas-
ingly farther apart in their goals for liberalizing agricultural trade.
In September 1989, the EC issued another communication 148 and in
December issued its third comprehensive proposal of the Round,149 the
essentials of which were the following: reduction in farm support must be
accomplished by reducing an aggregate measure of support;150 reduc-
tions were less than those called for in the Midterm Declaration and were
144. See NEWS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND BULLETINS FOR 1989, from NEWS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND No. 24 to NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND No. 32, inclusive.
145. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY RouND, No. 30, at 7-9 (Aug. 3, 1989).
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id.; GAIT AcrivmEs 1989 (1990) at 50.
148. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 31, at 8 (Oct. 16, 1989).
149. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 33, at 18 (Jan. 11, 1990).
150. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Press Background Briefs, at 20 (July 1990).
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only to occur in the short-term, for a five year period; tariffication was
not a preferred process for reducing border protection unless a process of
rebalancing existing border protections (the EC's border protection was
the variable levy) was put into place. 5' Using the rebalancing concept,
reducing the variable levy would occur in the following way: First, an
aggregate measure of all farm support-internal price supports, the vari-
able levy, and export subsidies-for a farm product would be calculated.
This is the figure to be reduced by a certain percentage each year, e.g.,
3% per annum. Next, a new, fixed tariff would be created which would
increase the price of the farm product up to certain limits as money ex-
change rates and the market price of the product fell. Thus, this new,
fixed tariff would rebalance, that is, protect, the price of the farm product
from fluctuations in the market, which is exactly what the variable levy
has done all along. With this proposal, the EC reaffirmed its desire to
use a system of dual pricing in agriculture.' 52 These ideas were criticized
at the September meeting of the NGAgri as preserving the status quo in
farm trade liberalization and as falling far short of the Midterm review
guidelines.
153
In October 1989, the U.S. issued its third proposal, which re-
mained for the most part its core proposal throughout the remainder of
the Round. 54 In the area of border protection, the proposal called for
the tariffication of nontariff barriers, with tariffs reduced to zero over ten
years. Additionally, price policies that distort trade, such as internal
support to increase production, would be phased out in five years and all
export subsidies and restrictions would be phased out in ten years.
Moreover, all forms of derogation, such as waivers and special accession
protocols from existing GATT rules, would be eliminated.
155
The year 1989 also saw proposals from several other players, includ-
ing two major ones, the Cairns Group and Japan.'56 In November 1989
the Cairns Group's proposal157 called for a ten year transition period of
irreversible liberalization using an AMS to reduce trade distorting poli-
cies. The tariffication of internal support that distorted trade was fa-
151. Id.
152. Fin. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, at 5, col. 3; Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 4, col. 1. See INTERNA-
TIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE CONSORTIUM, BRINGING AGRICULTURE INTO THE GATT:
TARIFFICATION AND REBALANCING 8-14 (Commissioned Paper No. 4, 1989).
153. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 31, at 8 (Oct. 14, 1989).
154. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 32, at 6-7 (Nov. 21, 1989).
155. Id.
156. GATT Acrivrrns 1989 (1990) at 50-51.
157. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 33, at 6 (Jan. 11, 1990).
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vored. Permissible internal support included humanitarian aid and
income decoupled from production and marketing. Also favored was the
elimination of all provisions in the agreement that allowed exceptions to
Article 11 prohibitions on quantitative restrictions. Further, the propo-
sal banned new export subsidies and froze existing ones, to be reduced
according to a schedule.15
Also in November, Japan and Korea each submitted similar propos-
als."59 Their proposals made food security a prime objective, emphasiz-
ing the importance of domestic support policies that maintained a
secured access to basic foodstuffs to preserve economic and political sta-
bility. Japan advocated that quotas should be allowed to restrict exports
in case of food shortages and that export subsidies as a major source of
trade distortion should be progressively reduced and eliminated."
The Nordic countries, Austria and Switzerland,' each submitted
proposals 62 that broadly advocated the aims of reducing farm support
but proposed a flexible approach that allowed some kinds of aid to be
reduced. Flexibility, it was argued, was necessary to accommodate na-
tional policy aims, such as the preservation of rural areas and the institu-
tion of small farming. It was further argued that border protection in
various forms such as quotas and variable levies should be permitted.163
In 1989, the developing importers' interests were represented by
three communications.'1 4 A joint proposal by Peru, Egypt, Mexico and
Morocco in October 65 and a paper in November by Bangladesh1 66 called
for compensation for the negative short-term and medium term effects of
agricultural liberalization. 67 Also in November, Brazil and Colombia,
as developing members of the Cairns Group, expanded on the Group's
158. Id.; GATT AcnvmEs 1989 (1990) at 50-51; GATT, Focus 68, at 5 (February 1990).
159. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 32, at 13 (Nov. 21, 1989); NEWS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, No. 33, at 7 (Jan. 11, 1990): GATT AcnvmEs 1989 (1990) at 52; NEws OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, Press Background Briefs, at 21 (July 1990).
160. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Press Background Briefs, at 21 (July 1990).
161. The proposals of these countries collectively represent the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) viewpoint EFTA is an association of European countries, including Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, who have chosen not to belong to the EC
because of the EC's political ties to the NATO treaty. EFTA countries are politically neutral.
162. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Press Background Briefs, at 20-21 (July 1990); NEws
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 31, at 8-9 (16 Oct 1989); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 32,
at 6-7 (Nov. 21, 1989); GATT AcnvrriEs 1989 (1990) at 52.
163. See sources cited supra note 162.
164. GATT AcnvmEs 1989 (1990) at 52.
165. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 32, at 7 (Nov. 21, 1989).
166. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 33, at 7 (Jan. 11, 1990).
167. It was expected that if agriculture were liberalized, prices for dairy products in those coun-
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proposal by stating that developing countries should be able to maintain
quantitative restrictions on food imports for economic and social devel-
opment needs.
168
Thus, not until the end of 1989 did all major players put forth com-
prehensive proposals that detailed their positions. It was clear that only
the U.S. wanted to eliminate all border protection, all internal support
and all export subsidies within ten years. Although in fundamental
agreement with the U.S., the Cairns Group was less stringent by allowing
farmers to receive price supports that did not increase the incentive to
produce. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries
wanted slow, flexible reduction of trade distorting policies. Japan wanted
to preserve border protections and internal supports on foodstuffs consid-
ered essential to political security and to eliminate export subsidies and
restrictions. The EC generally wanted a five-year, not necessarily irre-
versible, liberalization with the capability to rebalance the tariflication of
the variable levy in order to allow increases in support that would accom-
modate market fluctuations. It is common practice not to give one's rock
bottom offer in the beginning, but instead, to bargain point by point until
the absolute end of the negotiating period in order to concede the least
amount necessary to reach agreement.1 69 The UR proposals in agricul-
ture for 1989 had not changed appreciably from the 1987 proposals. Few
points had been bargained away and nothing had really been conceded.
If negotiation is a practice in exercising flexibility by exchanging conces-
sions, which makes precise results difficult to predict, and if it is a search
for finding acceptable formulae into which the details of the agreement
can be placed, 7' then what occurred in 1990 during the Round with
respect to agriculture was not "negotiation." Even though the Montreal
Midterm Declaration did state a very broad formula for negotiation, no
real concessions for liberalization were exchanged. Already by the end of
1989, an impasse between the U.S. and the EC was forming: their philos-
ophies of liberalization were too far apart. 71
tries would immediately rise by 49%, for cereals by 36% and for meat by 16%. GATT Ac'rvmEs
1989 (1990) at 52.
168. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 33, at 7 (Jan. 11, 1990).
169. ZARTMAN & BER AN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 195 (1982).
170. Id. at 118-121, 89-96.
171. Filipek, supra note 77, at 159-160.
[Vol. 39
THE G4 T AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
3.5 Deterioration of the Uruguay Round
3.5.1 1990 - January to October. Although in 1990 there was some
movement in the positions of the major players, the U.S.-EC impasse
took definable shape. None of the major players offered any new com-
munications in the six agriculture meetings held during the first part of
1990.172 At the June meeting of the NGAgri, the chairman, Aart de
Zeeuw, a retired Dutch businessman, reported that the informal consul-
tations of the last month and a half had failed to narrow disagreement on
internal support, border protection and export competition or to com-
plete a text to offer at the upcoming biannual TNC meeting in July. 73
Furthermore, there was no agreement on export competition. 74 At the
biannual TNC meeting in July, 1990, de Zeeuw submitted a "Chairman's
Text" as a working agriculture agreement with the understanding that it
did not represent consensus among contracting parties, but was merely
an expedient from which a "real" working text would be constructed.'75
According to Arthur Dunkel, Chairman of the TNC (at the level of offi-
cials), this text was a "means to intensify negotiations."' 76 However, the
irony was that because the Chairman's text favored the U.S.-Cairns
Group position, it may have prevented rather than promoted
compromise. 1
77
Since deadlines for achieving working drafts of agricultural agree-
ments were consistently not being met in the UR (for example with the
Midterm Declaration and the 1990 July TNC meeting), the July meeting
of the NGAgri focused on issues of timing. It planned an acceleration of
negotiations from September until the end of November, and set up the
deadline of October 15, 1990, as the last day for tabling of offers for
reducing farm aid.
178
At the biannual TNC meeting in the middle of July, Dunkel set the
172. See NEWS OF TH URUGUAY RoUND, Nos. 34-40 (Feb. 23, 1990; Apr. 19, 1990, June 1,
1990; June 19, 1990; July 16, 1990; July 30, 1990, Aug. 1, 1990). However, in February 1990, Israel
submitted a proposal and Canada submitted its second proposal in April. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, No. 34 at 11 (Feb. 23, 1990); NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 35, at 18 (Apr. 19,
1990).
173. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 38, at 11 (July 16, 1990).
174. Id.
175. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 39, at 5 (July 30, 1990); Interview with GATT
Delegate (October 9, 1990).
176. Id.
177. Interview with GAIT Delegate (October 9, 1990). The implications were pure Catch-22:
Negotiators were working to reach agreement on elements of a text, the use of which as a negotiating
instrument had not been agreed to.
178. NEws OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 39, at 5 (July 30, 1990).
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final agenda and timetable for the last remaining months of the UR. He
stressed accelerating the negotiations and focusing on problem spots, and
stated that intensive work would begin in late August, with the NGAgri
the first to start formal and informal meetings.179 From the July TNC
meeting came the final agenda as well as the following timetable for
achieving the written agreements upon which trade ministers would
make the final negotiations: 180
August 27 - October 7: Negotiating Groups to resolve outstanding issues;
October 8 - November 22: Stage of Final Agreements and Textwriting dur-
ing which senior officials were required to be present;
Early November: GNG would evaluate the results of negotiations in all
fourteen groups dealing with goods;
November 23: Deadline for submission of all final texts;
181
December 3 - 7: Closing meeting of the Round at Brussels, where trade
ministers were to meet to agree to the final texts hammered out in the last
months of the Round.
182
At the August meeting (August 27-29, 1990) of the NGAgri, dele-
gates discussed the substantive matter of how to apply GATT rules and
disciplines to agriculture as well as the procedural matter of how mem-
bers were to table final offers. These discussions turned into a stymied
debate over whether the rules and disciplines which specified violations
and remedies of the agricultural agreement-to-be could even be discussed
when basic elements of the final agreement were unknown.1
8 3
In September some trade ministers and others in the know began the
first public rumblings about a possible impasse in the UR.1s4 On October
6, Dunkel confirmed that the talks were behind the schedule he had set
up at the July TNC meeting."8 5 Moreover, two days later, Julius Katz,
179. GATT, Focus 73, at 1 (August 1990).
180. Id. at 2, 3, 12.
181. Consistent with its actions in the past, notably with respect to the Montreal Midterm Meet-
ing, the NGAgri broke these deadlines. There was no working text formulated by November 23, nor
even by the start of the Brussels meetings.
182. The final ministerial meeting had been already decided upon at the TNC meeting held on
December 20, 1989. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 33, at I (Jan. 11, 1990).
183. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, No. 41, at 1-2 (Oct. 9, 1990).
184. At a conference of trade ministers of the Pacific Basin in mid-September, which included
those of Japan and the U.S., it was reported that many ministers feared the negotiations would not
reach their goals and that the cost of impasse would be considerable since the countries of the Basin
represent 60% of GATT commerce. J. de Gen6ve, Sept. 13, 1990, at 6, col. 1. Also, Michael
Camdessus, the Director of the International Monetary Fund, expressed concern over the UR's lack
of progress. Fin. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
185. J. de Gen6ve, Oct. 6-7, 1990, at 7, col. 2.
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the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, said that the UR talks had not
reached a "critical mass," that none of the negotiating groups were close
to a proposed final text and that everything was being held up by every-
thing else. 86 It was implied that disagreements over agriculture and tex-
tiles were threatening the talks."'
3.5.2 October 1990. Although the U.S. had announced that it
would be tabling a new agricultural offer on September 24,188 the U.S.
proposal was not tabled until October 15, the declared deadline."8 9 On
October 15, the Cairns Group also tabled its final proposal which was
quite similar to the U.S. proposal.
190
On October 8, the EC had promised Dunkel to meet the October 15
deadline for tabling proposals in agriculture. 191 This was an ironic ges-
ture, since that very same day (October 8), the farm ministers of the
individual members of the EC rejected the proposal of Ray MacSharry,
the Irish EC Agricultural Commissioner, which called for a 30% cut in
overall farm support for ten years, starting with 1986 as the base year.192
186. Wall St. J.-Eur., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
187. Id.
188. Fin. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
189. The essential elements of the final U.S. proposal were familiar from its previous proposals
and included the following:
1) 90% reduction of export assistance over ten years for all countries and for all unprocessed prod-
ucts, such as dairy products, starting in 1991. U.S. deficiency payments on grain products were not
to be included in the category of export assistance but were classified as internal income support.
Reduction would be done by tariffication, i.e., converting this assistance into a tariff and then phas-
ing the tariff out. Export subsidies on processed products like wine and pasta would be reduced even
faster, with phase-out by 1996/97.
2) In the area of market access and border protection, all existing tariffs would be bound and all
non-tariff barriers, such as the variable levy, would be converted to bound tariffs. All tariffs would
then be reduced by 75% over 10 years starting in 1991.
3) Internal support that aids production (the most trade-distorting kind) would be reduced by 75%
over 10 years starting in 1991, with other internal support reduced by 30% during that period. Agra
Europe, Oct. 19, 1990 [hereinafter Agra Eur.].
190. What differed between the U.S. and the Cairns Group proposal was:
1) The U.S. deficiency payments on grain products were not to be classified as internal support but
as external subsidies. On this point, the EC and the Cairns Group were agreed.
2) In the area of market access and border protection, existing tariffs would be reduced by 50% in
10 years. If dumping or market disruption occurred during the last years of reduction, a penalty of
an additional tariff would be applied.
3) Internal support reductions would be two-tiered and accomplished using an aggregate measure of
support: the least developed countries would reduce by 45% in 10 years while others would reduce
by 75% in 10 years. Agra Eur., Oct. 19, 1990.
191. J. de Gen~ve, Oct. 8, 1990, at 11, col. 2.
192. Fin. Times, Oct. 9, 1990, at 2, col. 1. Ignaz Kiechle, the German farm minister was the
"most vocal critic." Id. See also Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 9, 1990, at 11, col. 4; Wall St. L-Eur.,
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The irony arises from the fact that over the next four weeks the EC farm
ministers would meet at least seven times in order to formulate an ac-
ceptable farm proposal that could be tabled to the NGAgri. 193 In those
four weeks, from October 12 to November 5, because of the EC farm
ministers' indecision and inability to agree among themselves, the farm
talks were suspended, and for all practical purposes the entire round of
talks were delayed. 194 The world community, as well as the GATT staff,
began to appreciate just how real the risk of impasse was. 195 The suspen-
sion affected progress in other areas as well.19 6 The schedule that Dunkel
had established at the July TNC meeting was crumbling.
197
Dunkel responded to the shutdown by encouraging only higher-
level delegates, who had the authority to make political decisions and
concessions on the spot, to attend the informal meetings.1 98 Dunkel also
called for crisis meetings among trade ministers in late October to pre-
vent a total breakdown of the Round. 199 However, these meetings were
Oct. 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (explaining that Jacques Mermaz, France's farm minister was also unable to
accept the plan, but that Britain and the Netherlands were for it).
Thus, six days before the deadline for tabling the last farm propoals in the Uruguay Round, the
U.S. was calling for 75% reduction in internal support and 90% reduction in export subsidies over
the next ten years whereas the French and German farm ministers of the EC felt that a 30% reduc-
tion in overall support was too high.
193. Instead of meeting as originally planned on October 14-15 to discuss MaeSharry's propo-
sal, the EC farm ministers postponed discussion of it until October 18, a full ten days after originally
vetoing the proposal and three days after the GATT deadline for tabling offers. 3. de Gen6ve, Oct.
12, 1990, at 11, col. 2. When the farm ministers refused that proposal a second time on October 18,
it became increasingly clear to many that the UR was in imminent danger of an impasse. The
danger arose in that the EC farm ministers were rejecting as too liberal MaeSharry's proposal, which
the Americans said was not anywhere near liberalized enough. Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 22, 1990,
at 11, col. 6.
194. In large part, the agricultural negotiations were blocked because Germany and particularly
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was strongly opposed to altering the internal support package of the CAP
in order to keep German farmers assured of their anticipated yearly income. Kohl was facing elec-
tions of a unified Germany on December 2, and was lobbying hard for the support of farmers from
the south Rhineland areas. Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1990, at A15, col. 6; Fin. Times, Oct. 20-21, 1990, at
2, col. 2.
195. It was believed that it had always been in the cards that the EC could "scupper" the UR.
EcoNoMISr, November 1990, at 70. Dunkel said for the first time that the risk of impasse is real.
Fin. Times, Nov. 3, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
196. For example, in the meetings of the NGServices that I attended during the last two weeks
of October, U.S. and Cairns Group delegates never let an opportunity pass to express their frustra-
tion at the EC's behavior in the farm talks.
197. Dunkel had set early November for the GNG to review progress reports from all the
groups negotiating goods. He pushed that review back to November 12. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No.41, at 1578 (Oct. 17, 1990).
198. J. de Gen6ve, Oct. 16, 1990, at 16, col. 7.
199. The crisis meetings were originally scheduled to begin after an informal TNC meeting on
Friday, November 2, and were to extend over the weekend of November 3-4. Expected to attend
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delayed,2"o and ultimately would never take place, because on November
5, the EC finally accepted MacSharry's original offer, which in effect was
not very different from the EC's earlier agricultural proposals. It was not
until November 6, that the EC tabled MacSharry's proposal at a TNC
meeting.20 1 The Americans20 2 and the Cairns Group2"3 found the EC's
proposal unacceptable because it did not separately reduce the three ele-
ments of farm trade liberalization, export subsidies, border protection
and internal support, but instead lumped these into an aggregate measure
of support that was reduced, which is how the EC had been structuring
were Carla Hills (U.S.T.R.), Frans Andriessen, the EC Trade Commissioner (Vice President in
charge of External Affairs) and Renato Ruggiero, the Italian Trade Minister. The crisis meeting was
considered timely inasmuch as the next meeting of the EC trade and farm ministers was scheduled
for November 5. A formal TNC meeting was called for November 6 in anticipation that the crisis
meetings would "work" to break the logjam. Fin. Times, Oct. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
200. Fin. Times, Nov. 3, 1990, at 2, col. 1. Another irony in the EC's behavior surfaced during
this period. During a weekend summit held on October 27-28 at Rome, leaders of the EC countries
met to discuss the state of the economy of the EC. Of primary interest was the upcoming economic
integration of 1992. Unmentioned at the Rome summit was the suspension of farm trade talks at the
UR, which the EC's farm ministers had precipitated, or indeed any other UR topic. Fin. Times,
Oct. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
201. The elements of the EC's final proposal were familiar from proposals of previous years:
(1) The EC wanted to accomplish farm trade liberalization by a lumping or a global approach in
which all kinds of farm support for a product would be lumped into an aggregate measure of support
that would then be reduced by 30% by 1995. The level of support in 1986 was the level upon which
this reduction would be calculated. However, in 1986 the EC paid the highest level of support ever
to its farmers, and since the EC had already reduced its overall farm support by 15% since 1986, the
actual reduction in farm support between 1991 and 1995 would only be another 15%.
Recall that lumping farm support is a fundamentally different approach than that taken by the
U.S. and the Cairns Group, who wanted specific reductions in each of these three areas: 75% reduc-
tion for internal supports, 75% reduction on import access or border protection, and 90% reduction
export subsidies. For the U.S. and the Cairns Group, reductions were to start in 1991 calculated
from 1991 levels of support and to continue for a ten year period. Thus, the reductions in support
that members had already achieved during the Uruguay Round would not be included in the U.S./
Cairns Group plan. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 2; id. at 4, col. 1. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 45, at 1724 (Nov. 14, 1990).
(2) The EC accepted tariffication as the process by which to reduce farm support on the condition
that tariffication of its variable levy would be done by rebalancing duties on imports of oilseeds and
non-grain foodstuffs. See supra notes 151 and 152 and accompanying text for a description of
rebalancing. In effect, rebalancing would allow the introduction of new tariff quotas on these prod-
ucts. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
(3) The EC contended that the U.S. deficiency payments to farmers were not internal supports as
the U.S. had classified them and subject to the 75% reduction rate in the U.S. proposal but were in
fact export subsidies that ought to be subject to the 90% reduction rate of that proposal. Id.
202. Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Representative, called for the EC to keep the promise it made
to President Bush at the G-7 meeting in Houston in July 1990 to separately reduce farm export
subsidies, internal support and border protection. Fin. Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at 4, col. 6.
203. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 8, 1990, at 11, col. 3; GATT, Focus 76, at 1-2 (November
1990).
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farm support reduction all along. This "lumping" would ultimately al-
low the EC to retain its export subsidies and its border protection of the
variable levy, while reducing less trade-distorting internal support
payments. 2'
3.5.3 November 1990. On November 7, Dunkel, ever the diplo-
matic strategist, °0 instituted the use of the TNC as the focal point for the
UR talks instead of allowing each of the fifteen negotiating groups to
continue negotiating in isolation."' As only the highest level delegates
of each mission typically represented the contracting party at a TNC
meeting, Dunkel's goal was to make these upper level delegates responsi-
ble for the progress of the talks. He was trying to force political decisions
by requiring that upper level delegates with authority do the negotiating.
Very intensive negotiations on agriculture began again on November
8th.
20 7
During the three and a half weeks between the EC's tabling its pro-
posal and the opening of the closing conference of the Round in Brussels
on December 3, where trade ministers would meet to decide on the final
package of agreements, the UR not only seriously floundered, but
reached an anticipated impasse.2 °" Those three and a half weeks are crit-
ical to understanding what happened at Brussels. As soon as the EC
finally tabled its offer, the general tenor at the GATT was that all things
were now possible, even if there were only weeks left to iron out the
enormous differences in the positions of the major players. What needed
to be done was to reach the "critical mass" of desire and discipline neces-
sary to pull off a successful round of negotiations by satisfying "the diver-
gent national interests. ' '2°9 To the extent that during those three and a
half weeks during November 1990, negotiators at all levels of discussion
from the informal group meetings to the formal TNC meetings perceived
that things could be worked out, the UR still had a chance of success.
However, several political events during November 1990 indicated that
204. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 2; id. at 4, col. 1.
205. See Phillippe Le BArbitre des tensions, 12 BILAN 16 (December 1990) (describing the soul
of the GATT Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, as essentially that of a "Suisse de 1'etranger" (a
Swiss who has lived abroad and therefore has a broader view of life) and pointing out his past
negotiating experience as the Director of Business at OECD and as chief agriculture negotiator to
the GAT for Switzerland). Id. at 16, 19, 23.
206.- Fin. Times, Nov. 3-4, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
207. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
208. See I. de Gen6ve, Nov. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 9, 1990, at 9, col. 2;
Agra Eur., Nov. 23, 1990, at El.
209. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 27, 1990, at 7, col. 2 (translated from French).
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the success of the Round was doubtful and an impasse in the agricultural
negotiations likely. Some of the more revealing events which served to
create a negative perception during this period included a mass demon-
stration of European farmers at the GAIT building in Geneva on No-
vember 13,210 two international conferences held in mid-November at
210. See La Suisse, Nov. 6, 1990, at 7, col. 3; . de Gen6ve, Nov. 8, 1990, at 21, col. 1; La Terre
Romande, Special Edition: GATT, Nov. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1; La Tribune de Gen6ve, Nov. 13, 1990,
at 1, col. 2; Nous, ou des hamburgers! (Us or hamburgers), La Tribune de Gen6ve, Nov. 14, 1990, at
1, col. 1; J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 14, 1990, at 17, col. 1; La Tribune de Gen6ve, Nov. 15, 1990, at 27, col.
3. See also NEWSWEEK (European Ed.), Nov. 26, 1990, at 7 (observing that a "placard help up by
European farmers" in this protest before the GAT said: "GATT Go Home-Via Iraq!"); Press
Release, Reuters News Services, Farmers Protest to GA7T Over Proposed Subsidy Cuts, Nov. 13,
1990, Geneva: REP PIG DM (stating that an "enormous effigy of Uncle Sam (the United States)
showed him with a small European farmer in his jaws and a burlap sack of dollars held to his
chest.")
Within a week of the EC's tabling MacSharry's proposal at the UR, a "monstre manifestation"
(giant demonstration) of about 7000 European farmers, mainly French, Swiss and German, took
place in Geneva. It began outside the gates of the Palais des Nations, the UN Headquarters, trav-
ersed three quarters of a mile to the William Rappard Centre, which houses the GAT, where the
farmers broke through the 10-feet high iron gates and demanded to speak with Arthur Dunkel,
chanting "assassin" until he finally appeared. Although not violent--except for storming the GAT
gates and breaking a window-the farmers carried all manner of signs that expressed sentiments in
anything but peaceful ways. Typical of the messages were "Don't GATT Us" and "Carla Hills is a
Witch."
The GAIT staff had anticipated the demonstration for several days. GAT Memo, Avis au
Personnel: Manifestation des Agriculteurs, INT(90)49 (Nov. 9, 1990). The GAT building officially
closed at noon that day. Since no negotiating meetings had been scheduled, there were few delegates
to witness the demonstration. Almost all GATT personnel left the building promptly at noon. By
the time the farmers arrived at 2:30PM the GATT was almost empty, except for a few of the highest
officers and the security staff.
These precautions were taken out of fear and concern that the farmers would become violent.
Many of the GAIT staff that I spoke with perceived the farmers as potentially violent and absolutely
bent on getting their way, as did delegates. (French farmers had been consistently demonstrating
with varying measures of violence since the summer of 1990. For example, they burned tires at an
airport where French President Mitterand landed to protest any potential change in France's posi-
tion on export subsidies. See infra note 276.)
I observed the demonstration by marching with the farmers from the Palais to the GAT build-
lag. It was the subject of much coverage in European newspapers and television. The farmers sym-
bolized their fight against any change in the CAP and against the reduction of the variable levy and
of export subsidies as the ultimate life and death struggle. They also symbolized the U.S. as an-evil
force to be overcome, since the U.S. was demanding "efficiency" in farming. In this struggle, Carla
Hills, the U.S.TR, became the embodiment of all the evil that the U.S. wanted to wreak on the
European farmers. Hence, she was symbolized as "die Hexe" (the witch). The message on signs and
posters, "Don't GAT Us," evinced several values: first, the farmers' need to remain small and
independent; second, the farmers' desire to remain in control of the quality of the food they pro-
duced; and third, the need to be creative or "non-efficient" in the way they farmed. All of these
values are counter to the farmers' stereotype of U.S. farming as big business, overmechanized,
wholly efficient, yet producing tasteless, nutritionless food.
Thus, the farmers' demonstration did more than demand no change in the CAP, it beseeched the
EC not to transform European farmers into those dreaded American ones. The demonstration was
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which world leaders met to discuss peace and international cooperation,
yet could not find a compromise solution to the agriculture issue,211 and
a press war throughout November between the U.S. and the EC blaming
each other for the potential impasse of the Round.212 The net effect of
as much about preserving the uniqueness of European culture as it was about reducing export
subsidies.-
211. The first of the two conferences was the annual meeting of state officials of the U.S. and the
EC, which began November 11. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 12, 1990, at 5, col. 4. These meetings were
designed to get some agreement on agriculture; discussions were held at very high political levels.
The conference lasted for ten days until November 18. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 15, 1990, at 11,
col. 2. Nonetheless, the Andreotti-Bush-Delors (Guilio Andreotti is the President of the EC Council
of Ministers; President Bush of the U.S.; Jacques Delors is the President of the EC Commission)
discussion on November 14, produced no concrete results. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 15, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
Further, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met with Delors in Brussels on November 16, and on
November 18, Carla Hills met with EC Trade Minister Frans Andriessen. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 17-18,
1990, at 5, col. 1. Neither of these discussions were productive. In fact after the Baker-Delors
discussion, Clayton Yeutter and Raymond MacSharry, the U.S. and the EC Agricultural Ministers
respectively, both expressed doubt that the gap between the U.S. and EC positions could be bridged.
Fin. Times, Nov. 17-18, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
On November 18, President Bush attempted some shuttle diplomacy to end the stalemate. In
Germany he met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl for lunch and then flew to France to have dinner
with President Francois Mitterand. At the same time, MacSharry and Yeutter met. J. de Gen6ve,
Nov. 17-18, 1990, at 9, col. 1. Not only did nothing come of these meetings, but press coverage
about the lack of agreement was played down.
The next day, November 19, opened the second international conference, the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, which was expected to culminate in a treaty to reduce stockpiles
of armaments on European soil. The U.S.-EC semiannual meetings had been to some extent a prel-
ude to the Security Conference, an event that upstaged the Uruguay Round as a media event for a
few days because it was viewed as a symbol of success, encouraging cooperation between the U.S.
and the EC. Fin. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at 2, col. 1. However, at the Security Conference, Jacques
Delors and Guilio Andreotti prevailed over George Bush by not allowing any mention of the poten-
tial results of the Uruguay Round into the text of an accord on the future security of Europe. J. de
Gen6ve, Nov. 12, 1990, at 5, col. 4. That action could be interpreted either that the EC knew it
would not change its offer enough to be palatable to the U.S. and the Cairns Group or that the EC
did not want the U.S. to coerce it into a UR agreement just for the sake of preserving the Security
Conference accord. Either way, that action was a vote of no confidence in whatever results were to
emerge from the UR.
212. A mild war of threats between the U.S. and EC had been on-going throughout the fall of
1990. However, it escalated immediately upon the realization that the EC was more intransigent
about institutionalizing its agricultural policy into the GATT agreements than was previously
thought. As the high level meetings in mid-November between U.S. and EC officials produced no
movement, Dunkel no longer hesitated to speak of the very real possibility of impasse. See supra
note 211; J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 13, 1990, at 5, col. 2.
On November 14, the restraints on internal support and export subsidies to U.S. farmers and the
restraints on border protection of U.S. farm products as specified in the U.S. agricultural proposal in
the UR were incorporated into the 1990 U.S. Farm Bill. This meant the U.S. was codifying its UR
farm proposal into law, at least for the short term. Also, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee refused to allow the President to accept a final agreement com-
ing out of the UR in outline form for fast track purposes. That is, in order to get a Congressional
vote on the whole UR package without debate or revision of any particular provisions, the President
1991] THE GAT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
these events was to signal to the delegates that the negotiations in agri-
culture were mired in what Dunkel called "declared positions. '213 If Oc-
tober 1990 was an example of the EC's intransigence about not reducing
export subsidies or dissolving its border protection, the variable levy,
then November 1990 demonstrated the U.S.'s intransigence in refusing to
negotiate on the EC proposal and in demanding that the proposal be
changed to reduce export subsidies and border protection. Already hav-
ing begun to incorporate into its domestic law some elements of its own
GAIT farm proposal,214 the U.S. feared that negotiation using the EC
proposal, that did not address reduction of export subsidies, would result
in institutionalizing the CAP into the GATT, which was to be avoided at
all costs. 215
had to present to Congress a fleshed out agreement. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 2. This
restriction as to the nature of an acceptable UR agreement plus the unilateral commitment to liber-
alize farm aid amounted to a congressional warning to the EC, to the GAIT staff and to all GATT
members that the U.S. Congress was not going to commit to just any result from the Round in order
to preserve the existence of the GATT. Actually, in past rounds, the U.S. had done just that, caved
in on many of its demands at the last minute to ensure that an agreement was reached. Int'l Herald
Tribune, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 13, col. 2.
Amid speculation as to whether the UR might extend past the scheduled end of the Brussels
ministerial meeting, Clayton Yeutter and Carla Hills, who had been adamant against extending the
Round, softened and stated for the first time in late November that the U.S. might consider ex-
tending the talks but only if the EC cooperated by discussing the reduction of farm export subsidies
(which the EC regarded as taboo). Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 19, 1990, at 11, col. 7; U.S. Mission
Daily Bulletin, Nov. 21, 1990, Geneva:EUR 21.
Also, in late November, Julius Katz, U.S. Asst. Trade Representative, implied that the two big-
gest agricultural subsidizers, the U.S. and the EC, had been unable to agree on basic principles
throughout the Round. He said that in four years, there had not been "one serious day of negotia-
tions." Fin. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
Just before Brussels, Dunkel said that the UR would succeed only if declared U.S. and EC posi-
tions were dropped. He strongly hinted that the U.S. might have to move out of its intransigent
position of flatly rejecting the EC's proposal because it did not address reducing export subsidies.
Fin. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Press Release, Reuters News Service, World Trade Chief
Calls for Realism in Row Over Farm Subsidies, Dec. 2, 1990, Brussels:EK-AMW-JMS.
.The U.S. began preparing a list of processed EC agricultural products, mainly French and Ger-
man, whose duties it would raise as early as January 1, 1991 as retortion for the EC's intransigent
attitudes in the GATT negotiations. The EC softened a little bit and hinted it might display a little
more negotiating maneuverability at Brussels than it had in the past. Press Release, Reuters News
Service, Battle or Truce on Farm Subsidies? U.S., EC Have to Decide Now, Nov. 29, 1990, Brus-
sels:291329-GMT. Throughout this dizzying political merry-go-(Uruguay)-round ride, the develop-
ing world stood back in mounting frustration as it watched the two hegemonies fight for the gold
ring of control over farm liberalization, in which developing nations felt they had a major stake. J.
de Gen6ve, Nov. 27, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
213. Fin. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
214. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 2. See supra note 212. See also Agra Er., Oct. 26,
1990, at N/6 (for a concise, specific summary of the 1990 Farm Bill).
215. Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 4, col. 1. See supra note 212.
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There were several ripple effects of the November impasse in farm
negotiations at the UR. One of the most notable was that a few days
before the November 23 deadline for the final text for Brussels, the U.S.
expressly declared that it would not support unconditional nondiscrimi-
natory, that is MFN, treatment in the services agreement draft.216
Although the U.S. did not clearly explain its abrupt about-face on serv-
ices,"' some of the impetus for it was probably due to the perception that
the UR would not produce an acceptable farm agreement. Without such
an agreement, developing exporters who were strongly relying on liberal-
ized agricultural trade, and who were concomitantly the strong and vocal
dissenters in the NGServices, would press for and probably achieve pro-
tection in the areas of market access and of investment/ownership rights.
This would create a totally unacceptable services agreement as far as the
U.S. was concerned.218 By beating the less developed countries to the
punch with the demand for conditional MFN, the U.S. tried to assure
that its service industries would be protected in rendering their techno-
logical know-how to less-developed countries who would not offer these
industries an unencumbered market share and profit margin. 219
A second ripple of the November impasse was that the final 391-
page draft agreement, which was to contain draft texts for all fifteen ne-
gotiating areas, and was the basic document upon which final negotia-
tions in Brussels would proceed, contained no draft text for agriculture.
Inserted into the final draft agreement was the very text drafted by the
NGAgri Chairman de Zeeuw in July 1990. It is important to remember
that this text had never been agreed to by the NGAgri, was drafted with
the help of GATT staff, and favored the U.S.-Caims position.220 Its in-
sertion into the final agreement only served to drive home the point that
216. Fin. Times, Nov. 22, 1990, at 8, col. 1; Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 22, 1990, at 2, col. 4; J. de
Gen6ve, Nov. 22, 1990, at 5, col. 1. See also Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 30 - Dec. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
The U.S. had been already been taking "flak for failure" to achieve even a modest agreement on
services because it had been especially unwilling to commit to unconditional MFN in telecommuni-
cations, air transport, and maritime shipping. At the same time, the U.S. was demanding uncondi-
tional MFN for the audiovisual sector (which includes the export of U.S. movies into foreign
markets). Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 16, col. 3.
217. It was implied that the U.S. was responding to pressure by AT&T as well as other strong
services lobbies. Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 30 - Dec. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1. See also Fin. Times, Oct. 19,
1990, at 4, col. I (stating that "AT&T wants the U.S. to retain the right to negotiate bilaterally
access to other countries' markets").
218. See Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, at 5, col. 5; Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 30 - Dec. 1, 1990, at 1, col.
1.
219. Fin. Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at 4, col. 1; see ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990, at 75; EUROMONEY,
November 1990, at 74; Lazar, supra note 78, at 139-40.
220. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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there had been no movement in the agricultural negotiations for over a
year.
In the days just before, and at the start of the Brussels meeting, the
trade ministers of the contracting parties and the GAIT staff knew they
faced "defeat,"" but some hope surfaced especially after Japan seemed
prepared to put the issue of rice imports, previously undiscussed, on the




What transpired at the Brussels Ministerial meeting, which was
scheduled to end the four years of UR talks, can be summed up as fol-
lows: the critical mass necessary to overcome the inertia of polarized po-
sitions in agriculture was never achieved.223 The Brussels meeting ended
without a package of agreements because the U.S. and the Cairns Group
were adamant that an agreement on reducing farm export subsidies was
an absolute requirement of any UR package and because the EC was
unwilling to negotiate specific reductions in that area. 224 That there was
no agreement between the U.S. and the EC on the agricultural negotia-
tions translated into an impasse for the Round.
The Brussels meeting from Monday, December 3, to Friday, De-
cember 7, 1990 was essentially a conference of the TNC (Trade Negotiat-
ing Committee) at the ministerial, not officials, level. This meant that in
Brussels the players changed. Instead of the high-level officials of each
mission, the trade minister and often the agriculture minister acted as
delegates and spokespersons. 225 The Brussels conference was not chaired
by Dunkel (who was chair of the TNC at the officials level), but by the
221. Wall St. J.-Eur., Dec. 4, 1990, at 2, col. 5.
222. Press Release, Reuters News Service, GATT-apan Minister, Dec. 3, 1990, Tokyo:SJM
JLW MS. The EC had already hinted that it had a little negotiating room in its proposal that it had
not yet revealed. Press Release, Reuters News Service, Battle or Truce on Farm Subsidies?, U.S., EC
Have to Decide Now, Nov. 29, 1990, Brussels:291329 GMT. South Korea was also prepared to make
some concessions in Brussels. Press Release, Reuters News Service, South Korea to Take "Flexible"
Position in GATT Talks, Dec. 1, 1990, Seoul:SSW-MMF-PS.
223. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 27, 1990, at 7, col. 1. Several observers predicted that a critical mass
would be necessary to pull the Round off and that most negotiators would be content with modest
results. See, eg., Fin. Times, Dec. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
224. J. de Genive, Dec. 11, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
225. However, the EC was an exception, as it was not represented by the ministers of trade and
agriculture who had intimate knowledge of the EC farm proposal and policy as developed through
the Fall of 1990. Instead, members of the EC Commission acted as delegates who sat in on the
negotiations and then reported back to the EC ministers. Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
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Uruguayan trade minister, Gros-Espiell. In most other respects, how-
ever, the game remained the same. There were formal meetings where
the entire TNC would meet to conclude agreements and informal meet-
ings of each negotiating group where delegates would to hammer out
differences in the 391-page working text. Since many informal groups
would be meeting simultaneously, a trade minister could not attend each
meeting. Instead, high-ranking substitutes with the authority to make
political decisions would attend. Moreover, several delegations took
along experts in specific trade areas, as well as business people who
would act as lobbyists. The U.S. delegation comprised 500 people, the
Japanese 300.226
The atmosphere of the Brussels meeting was similar to a conference
at a swank hotel in the middle of large urban downtown area that only
the uppercrust of the business world would attend, except it was on an
even grander scale. The ultramodern conference center was actually a
conference campus, with several interconnecting buildings that housed
movie theaters, stores and restaurants surrounded by gardens with a
human-made river running through.227  Thirty-thousand farmers de-
scended on the periphery of the conference center on December 3, the
opening day of the meetings, to make their opposition felt and to make
opening day a "spectacle.
' 22 1
226. On the other hand, Germany maintained a very low profil6 at the Brussels meeting. It sent
no ministers. Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at 3, col. 1. It was reported that Switzerland had a powerful
delegation because it sent 30 delegates. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 1-2, 90, at 6, col. 1.
227. Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 2. And as at a business conference at a hotel, some of
the most basic needs did not seem efficiently provided. Three days after the Brussels conference
ended, members of the GATT support staff spoke to me about the earphone situation. Unlike in the
UN Building or the GATT centre where meeting rooms are equipped with a set of earphones perma-
nently affixed to each chair so that all attending may listen to an instantaneous translation of the
proceedings in French, Spanish or English, none of the conference rooms in Brussels was so
equipped. Delegates had to remember before entering a meeting to pick up earphones at a dispens-
ing location some distance away from the meeting room. Also, once outfitted, delegates were re-
quired to carry their earphones with them. The result was that delegates who did not remember to
take their earphones with them were constantly having to borrow or get new ones. Interview with
GATT staff (Dec. 10, 1990).
The earphone situation created the inconvenience of not having easy access to what was going on
in the Brussels meetings and represents a small but significant error in planning that raises a nagging
doubt about the insight that went into the planning of the Brussels conference.
228. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 4, 1990, at 7, col. 2. Most of the farmers were French, German and
Belgian. Others included Swedish, Swiss, British, Italians as well as Japanese and South Koreans.
Many of their signs read "Ne Gattez Pas L'Avenir de l'Agriculture" (Don't GATT the Future of
Agriculture). Id. Police used water cannon on the farmers to disperse them and by Tuesday their
numbers had decreased. The EC building in Brussels was heavily guarded and ringed with barbed
wire. Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at 3, col. 2.
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The meeting began around noon on Monday, December 3, with a
series of addresses to the ministers. Because "the menace of an impasse
at Brussels [was] very real,"229 and because agriculture and services were
to be discussed in the TNC for the first two days, it had been predicted
that the end of the Round would be played out in the first few hours into
one of three outcomes, "rupture," "happy ending" or "prolongation."
230
However, the Brussels meeting was not quite that predictable and seemed
as if on a see-saw.23'
By the end of the second day, comments such as "total impasse"
made by the Canadian trade minister, "end of the road" made by the
New Zealand trade minister and "very close to collapse" by the U.S.
Ambassador to the GATT abounded.232 Mats Hellstrom, the Swedish
Agriculture Minister who chaired the agricultural talks at Brussels, said
that there was no basis for negotiation because, as Dunkel pointed out,
not one political decision to compromise had been made.233 The IMF
director, Michael Camdessus, gave a pep talk through the press to the
farm negotiators to impress upon them how great the stakes were. He
stated that the abolition of farm supports would increase the foreign
earnings of farm exporting nations by some fifty billion dollars.234
The EC began blaming the Americans for their intransigence by not
yielding to unconditional MFN in the services sectors of telecommunica-
tions and maritime transport.23 On their part, the American delegates
did show some signs of compromise, but their willingness to commit to
unconditional MFN depended on some less-developed countries keeping
promises to maintain open market access in the banking and insurance
229. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 1-2, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (translated from French).
230. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 27, 1990, at 7, col. 1 (translated from French). French seems to convey
a slightly different meaning than English in speaking of negotiating events. For example, it seemed
to me that the English word impasse was more often used in the English press and by the GAT
staff to mean both the general breakdown in the talks and a stalemate specific to an issue and to a
meeting. The French press seemed to use the word "rupture" to denote a general impasse but the
connotation of "rupture" was certainly different than that of impasse. "Rupture" connotes images
of a break in the pathway of negotiations, a chasm to be bridged. "Impasse" implies no break, rather
an obstacle to be removed from the path. The French press also used the word "blocage," which
often denoted a specific stalemate. "Blocage" is a cognate for blockage and connotes, like "im-
passe," an obstacle to be removed.
It seems fascinating that French speakers and English speakers describing the same events of the
UR attached different meaning to them and thus conceptualized different strategies for dealing with
the same events.
231. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
232. Fin. Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
233. Id.
234. Fin. Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at 4, col. 3.
235. Wall St. J.-Eur., Dec. 6, 1990, at 2, col 1.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
areas.2 36 Most delegates blamed the EC for the official deadlock that was
declared by Tuesday evening.2 37
The Round was revived, however, largely due to the herculean ef-
forts of Hellstrom, who got the EC to at least re-think some aspects of its
position, if not actually to budge from it.
238
Using a nine item questionnaire that Dunkel had inserted into the
agricultural working draft,2 39 Hellstrom produced in just two days a
working text of an agricultural agreement that was a genuine compro-
mise between the U.S. and the EC positions.2' The text was short and
simple yet dealt with reduction in each of the three areas of internal sup-
port, export subsidies and border protection, designed to please the U.S.
and the Cairns Group. The reductions would be 3% per year for the
next five years, using 1986-the year of highest farm support-as the
base year. This was designed to please the EC.241
The Chairman of the conference, Uruguayan Minister Gros-Espiell,
gave an ultimatum that a preliminary breakthrough had to occur in the
farm negotiations by noon Thursday, December 6, or the conference was
over. He later extended the deadline to 5:00PM Thursday afternoon as
the EC farm and trade ministers were meeting on Thursday morning and
he wanted to give them time to change their bargaining position and to
begin serious negotiation.242 Up until this point at the Brussels confer-
ence, the agricultural meetings had either been formal or informal ses-
sions of the NGAgri. On Thursday, things started to change; for the first
time, the negotiations became serious, the negotiators were going into the
236. J. de Gen~ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
237. For example, on Wednesday evening (Dec. 6), 24 hours after impasse was officially de-
clared, the EC still had not budged. Neal Blewett, Australian Trade Minister, blamed the EC,
stating that "for all practical purposes, the UR is dead in the water." Wall St. J.-Eur., Dec. 6, 1990,
at 2, col. 1. Rubens Ricupero, Brazilian Ambassador to the GATT, acting as spokesperson, issued a
joint statement on Wednesday evening of 70 developing countries that blamed the EC. Id.; Fin.
Times, Dec. 6, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
238. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, col. 7, at 1.
239. Fin. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at 4, col. 1; J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
240. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1. During an interview earlier in the fall of 1990, I
asked a Swedish delegate who did not participate in the agricultural negotiations how he thought the
Nordics and Sweden were viewed by other delegates. At the time, I thought his answer was self-
serving. He said, "we are perceived as a voice of reason, as flexible and not extremist." Interview
with Delegate (Oct. 5, 1990). In reviewing what Mats Hellstrom was able to accomplish in two days
as compared to what had remained unchanged in four years of negotiation, I realized that I had
undervalued the insight of the Swedish delegate.
241. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 4; Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, at 1, col. 3.
242. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
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"green room.""4 3 Pessimism reigned at the conference on Thursday
morning. However, because the EC had declared itself ready to discuss
export subsidies and the Americans had modified their stance on condi-
tional MFN in services, David Woods, the press relations officer of the
GATT, stated that there was no more impasse.' 4
The NGAgri met at 8:00PM Thursday evening and were told to be
prepared to stay all night. Nonetheless, by 9:30PM, a short hour and a
half later, the discussions were going nowhere. The EC delegates stated
that they would only discuss the Hellstrom text if a list of pre-conditions
were met, which would in effect turn Hellstrom's text into the EC propo-
sal.24 To some, the Uruguay Round had just ruptured.2' The GATT
staff circulated a proposal for adjournment on Friday morning even
though 1 1:00AM meetings had been scheduled for areas other than agri-
culture. 7 At a Friday morning press conference, EC officials were de-
fensive about the lack of progress in the Brussels meetings and a little
later the Round was officially pronounced in impasse.2 48
243. "Green Room" negotiations can occur once disagreement has been narrowed to small but
very significant differences among negotiators. These are often long, intense sessions conducted by
Dunkel himself in an informal setting to crystallize and to agree on the specific boundaries of disa-
greement and then to search pragmatically for a common formula to resolve them. Interview with
Delegate (Nov. 9, 1990).
They are called "green room" negotiations because the conference room next to Dunkel's office in
the GATT building, where such meetings took place during the Round, is painted green. On
Wednesday, after the impasse was declared, the NGAgri broke into informal groups, but there was
no "green room" meeting scheduled then because there was no common ground. J. de Gen6ve, Dec.
5, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
244. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 13, col. 1.
245. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2.
246. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7, col. 4. At that time, Julius Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative, believed that the negotiations would be suspended. And Ray MacSharry said that
the U.S. expectations about deep cuts in subsidies had been totally unrealistic. Wall St. J.-Eur., Dec.
7, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
247. Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
248. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2. On Friday Dec. 7, I arrived at the GATT library
about 12:30PM and remained there until it closed at 5:30PM. A curious thing had happened: there
seemed to be a news blackout of sorts. Staff of the GATIT library, which is a department within the
press relations division of the GATT, were unable to get through by telephone to other GATT
members of that division stationed in the press room at the Brussels conference center. The GAIT
staff in Geneva were surprised and were unable to account for the breakdown in communication.
In any event, by 2:00PM it became known throughout the GATT building that an "adjourn-
ment" of the Round had occurred. By Monday December 10, a memo had circulated to the GATT
staff asking them to prepare themselves for the return of the delegates, which may be as early as Jan.
25, 1991. The memo also implied that some informal meetings might even begin before Christmas
1990. Thus, the sense from the GATT staff was that the Round was not over; it was entering a new
phase.
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3.7 Responses to and Predicted Consequences of the Impasse
This section will look at some of the underlying reasons why the
impasse occurred. The discussion directly below will touch on some of
the immediate responses to what happened at Brussels and why, and
what were believed to be the consequences of a failed Round. Explana-
tions about why the Brussels conference failed were more easily formu-
lated than statements naming the event that had occurred there. The
press seemed in agreement that the EC's negotiating strategy at Brussels
had created disarray and disharmony in the NGAgri as well as in other
negotiating groups, and that the EC as a negotiating institution had acted
as a dinosaur, unable to move under the weight of its own bureau-
cracy.249 The press also agreed that the impasse resulted in part from EC
myopia about its own importance in the world trading system,25 0 and in
part from the U.S. fear that the rest of the world wanted to encroach on
its privileged position of being front and center in the world economic
picture.251 Also, an increase in political tensions among developed na-
tions, which was an unanticipated consequence of the dissipation of the
Soviet threat, encouraged the U.S. to be much less willing to back down
than in past Rounds.25 2 In addition, the absolute lack of chemistry be-
tween the U.S. and EC players,25 3 as well as the plain and simple fact
that the 391-page draft agreement presented a much too complicated
agenda for many ministers to understand and work on, made a bad situa-
tion worse.25 4
In trying to name the event that transpired at Brussels, press reports
were full of contradictions largely because "what happened" depended
249. Wall St. J.-Eur., Dec. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 6; Fin. Times Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3. The
negotiating strategy of keeping the farm and trade ministers who had formulated the EC proposal
away from the Brussels meeting, by ensconcing them in another building in the conference center,
created tremendous communication difficulties. The trade and farm ministers were the policy cre-
ators yet were unable to act as policy negotiators and the policy negotiators at Brussels did not take
pains to inform the ministers about what was going on in the meetings. The ministers could not
respond in order to make the necessary concessions, even if they had wanted to. Fin. Times, Dec. 7,
1990, at 2, col. 1.
250. Fin. Times, Dec. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2; Wall St. J.-
Eur., Dec. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 6; Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
251. Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3; J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 10, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
252. Wall St. L-Eur., Dec. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 6; Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2.
253. Jacques Mermaz, the French farm minister, said that it was "impossible to have a polite
conversation with an American." Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3. Carla Hills was perceived
as having a combative personality while Ray MacSharry was regarded as consumed with self-interest
because he was trying to please his Irish constituency in order to run successfully for president. Fin.
Times, Dec. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
254. Fin. Times, Dec. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
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on whether the delegates would re-convene sometime in the future.
Identifying what happened, then, necessarily included some degree of
hope attached to a prolongation of the Round.2"' Some expressed a
sense of futility about reconvening the talks because the U.S. Congress
would have to extend the fast-track authority of the U.S. President past
March 1, 1991, an act which Congress was not likely to do given its
current protebtionist stance which was worsened by the meager person-
nel and money commitments of Germany and Japan to the crisis in the
Gulf.
256
A failure to achieve even modest results at Brussels was a surprise to
some, given that the anticipated consequences of such a failure had been
reported as grave. From early October, even before the debacle of the
EC ministers' inability to reach political consensus on a farm proposal,
the U.S. was making veiled threats about what would happen if the
Round failed. For example, Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture,
said that the U.S. would consider expanding its farm subsidies (and wors-
ening distorted trade in agriculture) if the Round did not achieve U.S.
objectives.257 Carla Hills declared that trade conflicts would proliferate
and become worse than those of the 1980s, and that she would not hesi-
tate to use the tool of § 301 of the 1988 Trade Act to pry open protec-
tionist markets.
258
As these statements imply, a major consequence of a failed UR was
that sectoral trade wars would most likely flare up, especially in agricul-
ture.259 Other predicted consequences included a significantly reduced
world economy throughout the 1990s as an increased number of subsi-
dies and tariffs reduced access to foreign markets and stymied business
expansion.260 Consumers would pay more for food and long-term infla-
tion would ensue. A failed UR would accelerate the general fragmenta-
255. For example, the GATT staff used the word adjournment The original idea was that
Dunkel would shuttle between capitals in the weeks after Brussels to narrow preferences about farm
trade support. This shuttle diplomacy would ease the reconvening of talks in January 1991. Wall St.
J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2. The American and British press named the event a "collapse" of the
trade talks. Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 3; Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 1, col. 7. Other
names called the event as a "failure" of the trade talks (J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 10, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Wall
St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at A4, col. 2) or as an "indefinite adjournment" (Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at
1, col. 3).
256. See infra note 274. Recall that the President's fast-track authority meant that Congress
must vote yes/no on the entire package of UR agreements presented by the President. See supra
note 212.
257. U.S. Mission Daily Bulletin, Oct. 9, 1990, Geneva:EUR 215.
258. Fin. Times, Oct. 13-14, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 13, col. 2.
259. Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 6; Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
260. Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
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tion of the liberalized world trading system into regional trading blocs
that would restructure trade flows, keeping less industrialized countries
out of mainstream trade. This fragmentation would work to increase
political tensions between blocs and foster breakdown in diplomatic ne-
gotiations, potentially precipitating political, not just economic,
aggression.
261
Although few believed that a failure would cause members to repu-
diate their existing GAIT agreements, some did believe that a failure
would indicate the beginning of the end of the GATT regime.262 That
possibility created fear because no one was able to predict just how far
the existing trade rules, which had been established over the last forty-
three years, would unravel or just how protectionist the world would be
willing to become.263 According to a recent World Bank study, had the
UR resulted in an eventual removal of protectionism in agriculture, the
total income of the less-developed countries stood to increase by 21/2
times the current level of all development aid given by industrialized
countries. 264 That an agreement in farm trade was not achieved, given its
potential for great gains to some nations, indicates a frightful willingness
on the part of other nations to remain protectionistic.
Most of the predicted consequences mentioned above are long-term.
A short-term, immediate consequence was that only three days after the
Brussels conference ended, the U.S. prepared to increase duties by 200%,
as of January 1, 1991, on EC agricultural and beverage exports, such as
liqueurs, mineral waters, artichokes and cheese.2 65  Also, the U.S. Con-
gress included in the budget law enacted in November 1990 a provision
that would require U.S. policy on farm exports to become more aggres-
sively protectionist in case the UR talks failed. Specifically, the budget
law demands that the Secretary of Agriculture must remove al spending
cuts on agriculture put in place by the 1990 Farm Bill if there is no trade
agreement reached by June 30, 1992, and that the Secretary must in-
crease export subsidies on agricultural products if no agreement materi-
alizes by June 30, 1993.266
Trade negotiators were generally aware of these predicted conse-
quences of failure. Perhaps the single largest impetus at the end of the
261. Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
262. See Schott, supra note 73; Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A4, col. 4; Buff. News, Dec. 16,
1990, at H7, col. 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
263. WaHl St. J.-Eur., Nov. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
264. Id.
265. Fin. Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
266. Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1990, at A2, col. 2.
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Round for their continued efforts was the fear of the economic unknown:
what would the world be like without a successful trade agreement?
Nevertheless, even specters of the GATT's demise, of impending trade
wars and of a stagnated world economy, did not rouse the necessary
political will to give up protectionist farm policies in order to get liberal-
ized trading benefits.
4.0 ANALYSIS
The analysis presented here relies not only on material published
about the Round, but also on my interviews with delegates and with
GATT staff who participated in the Round, as well as on my observa-
tions of some of the formal meetings. The important factors explaining
why the impasse at the Brussels conference of the UR occurred fall into
three categories: political, ideological and organizational. Political fac-
tors were chosen to analyze the impasse because they were the most visi-
ble and the most talked about. Ideological factors were chosen because
these seemed most pervasive and probably, in the long run, accounted for
the political factors. The category of organizational factors includes the
influencing of delegates, by the GATT staff, to change their positions and
the structure of contracting parties' trade delegations that facilitated
such influencing. These factors were selected because they had a subtle,
yet a very direct influence on the impasse.
4.1 Political Factors
Probably the single most important political factor influencing the
failure of the Brussels meetings was the overall change in world politics
since the start of the UR in September 1986.267 This overall change in-
cluded a dramatic shift in East-West relations owing to the development
of political democratization in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and
the virtual end of Cold War politics with the Soviet Union.268 A con-
comitant and equally important shift in world politics was the relative
loss of U.S. hegemony in the world economy.2 69 Demonstrative that the
U.S. Congress perceived a loss of U.S. economic dominance, is the pas-
267. Interview with Delegate (Oct. 18, 1990).
268. This political democratization has had astoundingly quick and deep economic ramifica-
tions for the West. See, eg., Sheedy & Dean, Gaining a Foothold in the Soviet Market" How to
Establish a Representative Office, 25 INT'L LAW. 103 (1991); Slupinski, Foreign Investment in the
Banking Sector and Emergence of the Financial Market in Poland, 25 INT'L LAW. 127 (1991).
269. Fin. Times, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 6, col. 3; see Thurow, Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 10, 1990, at
10, col. 3. It is not by any means clear that the U.S. has lost or gained absolute hegemony in the
world economy since the commencement of the UR. See J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 28, 1990, at 5, col. 2.
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sage of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act with its section
"Super 301, '27° providing the U.S. Trade Representative with a unilat-
eral measure to threaten retaliation against what she perceives as unlaw-
ful protectionism against U.S. goods in foreign markets. 271 Also
demonstrative of Congressional protectionism is the passage of the Tex-
tile, Clothing and Footwear Bill of 1990 in October 1990272 (the Presi-
dent subsequently vetoed it), which sent an unmistakable message to the
world and to the Round negotiators that the U.S. was not willing to sac-
rifice its southern textile mills to newly-industrializing Asian countries,
such as Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia. The U.S. Administration's fears
about economic encroachment played out in the intransigence with
which all American negotiators, from Baker to Hills, and Yeutter to
lower level delegates, approached the issue of agricultural export subsi-
dies. Originally the U.S. demanded zero subsidies after ten years of re-
duction, and capitulated only after 31/2 years of hitting heads with the
EC (which did not want to reduce export subsidies at all), with a revised
demand not appreciably different: a 90% reduction in export subsidies
after ten years. If the EC bore the brunt of criticism about not budging
on its position, U.S. behavior was no model of compromise and coopera-
tion either.273
Besides the perception that the U.S. had lost economic status, two
other political factors 274 directly accounted for the impasse at Brussels:
lobbying by interest groups and the relative rise in political and economic
importance of some of the less developed countries, particularly those of
Latin America. 275 The EC Commission and delegates were lobbied by
European farmers, mainly French and German, who staged demonstra-
270. See supra note 28.
271. Carla Hills wielded the sword of the § Super 301 in May 1989 by naming Japan, India and
Brazil as violators. The EC, Canada, Mexico, Argentina and the Nordic countries criticized the U.S.
action at the next GATr Council Meeting. See generally Recent Developments, supra note 67.
272. H.R. 4328, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
273. See J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 8-9, 1990, at 7, col. I; Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1990, at AI0, col. 5.
274. See J. de Gen~ve, Sept. 7, 1990, at 6, col. 1. It should be noted that another political factor
was the U.S. outpouring of personnel, money and energy to liberate Kuwait. However, this factor
did not become important until the end of November after the Security Council countenanced the
potential use of force in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it may be more important for explaining why
the U.S. did not push for a quick resolution of the Round after the Brussels impasse than for explain-
ing why the impasse occurred. The U.S. greatly valued its contributions to the Gulf War and re-
mained staunch against the protectionist demands of Germany and Japan, who were perceived as
derelict in their duty to free Kuwait.
275. This short list neither attempts to be inclusive nor to leave out other obvious political
factors, such as the difference in urgency each side felt for the need of agricultural liberalization.
That the U.S. was in a hurry to get farm liberalization over yesterday and the EC was only willing to
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think about it tomorrow translated into a repeatedly unacknowledged and undervalued difference in
the extent and timing of such liberalization.
Further, this list focuses on the political factors external to the negotiating context. Even though
I observed some of the formal negotiation sessions, I am uncomfortable including my observations in
the analysis section of the main body of this paper. I was neither a systematic, long-term or legiti-
mate observer and my observations go more towards describing influences within the negotiating
context.
For example, I interviewed both EC and American delegates of the agriculture negotiations. In
the interview with the American delegate, a man identified as an expert in agriculture working for
the government and who periodically came from Washington to sit in on NGAgri meetings as re-
quested by the delegation, joined the interview. I believe the delegate invited him to join us for two
reasons. First, as I was a neophyte, interviewing a farm expert would be immensely helpful (and it
was; and I am very grateful to that delegate for having him join us). Second, because I was an
outsider to the negotiating community, the "American" way to control the negotiating environment
as well as the press and world opinion is to give the most -expert answers. Another aspect of the
American way to gain control is to table the most detailed, complex and statistically sophisticated
proposals and to devalue non-economic and social objectives when they interfere with trade liberali-
zation. The U.S. delegates' approach to my interview reminded me much of the old TV series Drag-
net: they gave me nothing but the facts.
When asked about the EC social policy of trying to preserve a rural/urban demography and a
farming work force, the American delegates waved this off, imputing economic motives to preserve
the CAP, which, they said, maintains for the EC an unfairly-acquired comparative advantage in
farm products, raw and processed. The theme of devaluing the stated non-economic motive for
preserving the CAP by the EC also ran through a later interview with a high-level GAT" staff
member working in the Agricultural Division.
Even though the EC did indeed have a strong economic motive to maintain an unfairly-acquired
comparative advantage in agriculture by trying to incorporate its CAP into the GATI, the U.S. as
well as the GATT staff seemed unwilling to accept that the EC, Japan and Korea might have had
reasonable and valuable non-economic motives for not wanting to liberalize farm trade in a hurry.
By not acknowledging the EC's perceived need to preserve a much-valued cultural myth that farm-
ing as a way of life originates and renews a society's most revered values of self-preservation, disci-
pline, purity and strength, the U.S. forced the EC to increasingly romanticize farming and to crusade
for it. Although the interview with the EC delegate was more personal, it was also more restricted
by etiquette because this delegate was much higher up in the delegation hierarchy than the Ameri-
cans I had interviewed. Where the Americans were overly efficient, the EC delegate was obfusca-
tory. Our interview occurred just before the October 15th deadline for tabling farm proposals. He
was sensitive to my being an American and that the press was beginning to blame the EC for unnec-
essary delay in reaching an acceptable farm proposal.
If the U.S. delegates had been unwilling to consider social motives for preserving protectionist
farm support policies, that was the primary topic of interest to the EC delegate. In fact, he was
uncomfortable in discussing reduction of farm support at all and especially uncomfortable in discuss-
ing the concept of rebalancing. See supra notes 151 & 152 and accompanying text. Some of his
unwillingness was no doubt due to his not wanting to prematurely reveal to me any details of the
not-yet-agreed upon EC proposal for farm liberalization. Although he did not admit it, he implied
that the political machinery of the EC was almost overburdened and too complex, which became
apparent in the Brussels conference. I believe much of his unwillingness to talk facts, as the Ameri-
cans had done, was due to his belonging to a de-centered and fragmented political culture that
frowned on giving facts and hard answers.
Another factor that affected the internal politics of the negotiating arena was the cultural differ-
ence in the negotiating style between the U.S. and the EC as reported in the press. At Brussels, the
U.S. and the EC farm delegates had no personal chemistry, making it harder to agree. My observa-
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tions designed to elicit popular support. 6 The U.S. delegates were lob-
bied by large business organizations in a behind-the-scenes manner
designed to promote the successful conclusion of agreements in services,
investment measures (TRIMS) and intellectual property (TRIPS).2 77
This difference in lobbying pressures on the two major actors of the
Round precipitated the need for a more-than-modest agreement in
agriculture.
278
tions in meetings of the NGAgri, NGServices and of the GATT Council affirmed to some extent this
lack of spark.
For example, in a services negotiating session or a Council meeting, even though the U.S. and the
EC may have been on the same side of an issue, they quibbled over each other's comments. The
verbal exchanges between the U.S. and Australia, the U.S. and New Zealand, the U.S. and Canada,
who had several unresolved, major disputes pending resolution in the Council were generally spoken
in a friendly tone and often with humor. See, eg., GATT, DS7/R* (Sept. 18, 1990) (outlining
Canada-U.S. subsidies-countervailing duty dispute on Canadian pork imports into the U.S.); GATT,
L/6994 (June 29, 1990) (describing U.S. recourse to art. 23 for Canada's refusal to lift import restric-
tions on yogurt and ice cream). However, the verbal exchanges between the U.S. and the EC, who
also had several unresolved but acrimonious disputes pending resolution in the Council were gener-
ally spoken in strained tones, with little humor and much barb. The U.S. delegates in particular
spoke in a haughty, condescending manner. See, eg., Wall St. J.-Eur., Oct. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 5;
Fin. Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at 4, col. 2 (discussing EC's ban on U.S. pork and beef imports for alleged
violations of sanitary standards); see also J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 21, 1990, at 4, col. 4 (the U.S. threatens
retaliatory measures against the EC on EC imports of mineral water, cheese and cognac because the
EC has not paid the U.S. compensation for Spain and Portugal's tariffs on corn since their entry into
the EC in 1986).
I found it curious that in every meeting I attended the seating arrangement always placed the EC
and the U.S. on opposite sides of the room. It was also curious that the U.S. and EC delegations did
not socialize much with each other after entering the negotiating room and before the meeting began,
an activity I believe of much valence for indicating the "chemistry" among players. Normally, the
U.S. delegates socialized most readily with those seated nearby, such as the delegates from Sweden,
Switzerland, Uruguay, or with those delegates who might saunter over to the U.S. seats to discuss an
issue, such as an Australian, a Canadian, or a Hungarian. Once in the meeting room, neither the
U.S. nor the EC approached each other's area. It is important to note that even though there was
little socializing among the American and Japanese delegations in the meeting rooms, during meet-
ings delegates from both parties spoke to and of each other with respect and without condescension.
Because most negotiation is done informally and because I was unable to participate in informal
negotiating, what I am implying may be an artifact of my limited ability to observe. If my observa-
tions are accurate, however, as evidenced from within the negotiating arena, they support the prem-
ise that the U.S. and the EC perceived that each was the other's rival.
276. See supra notes 210 & 228. See also Fin. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at 36, col. 4 (for a general
understanding of how determined French farmers are to hold on to their way of life); Fin. Times,
Oct. 11, 1990, at 18, col. I (discussing a demonstration by French farmers at President Mitterand's
inauguration of an Airbus manufacturing facility at Toulouse where they burned tires and bales of
straw and spread liquid manure); Press Release, Reuters News Service, Angry French Farmers to
Shut Borders to Beef Imports, Nov. 29, 1990, Paris:291145 GMT (stating that French farmers, angry
over falling beef prices, planned to block beef imports from eastern Germany and Eastern Europe).
277. See Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1549 (Oct. 10, 1990); Wall St. J.-Eur., Nov. 30 -
Dec. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 30, 1990, at 15, col. 2.
278. I do not mean to imply that the EC was not lobbied by its service industry; it was. See, e.g.,
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Throughout the UR, the U.S. Administration maintained the all or
nothing attitude that an acceptable package could only be a composite of
agreements in all areas, especially agriculture, and that an acceptable ag-
ricultural package had to comprise total or almost total reduction of
farm export subsidies. 9 By doing this, and by spearheading the new
and complicated area of services as a necessary item on the Round
agenda,28 0 the U.S. Administration set itself up as a target for lobbyists
from multinational corporations and large financial institutions. These
lobbyists linked their concessions to the requirement that less-developed
countries maintain "developed-style" market access, that is, totally trans-
parent and open markets.281 In turn, the developing exporters linked
open market access for the developed world's banking and services (espe-
cially telecommunications) industries with open market access for their
agricultural products in the developed world. Thus, the developing ex-
porters were more or less willing to open their service markets to U.S.
firms only if agricultural trade were significantly liberalized, and if the
developed exporters reduced export subsidies enough to create a chance
for the less-developed exporters to trade farm products on a more equal
footing.282 Consequently, U.S. service industries included agricultural
liberalization as a necessary condition in their lobbying to the U.S.
Administration.
It is no accident, therefore, that two weeks before Brussels the U.S.
declared that it could not support unconditional MFN treatment in the
service agreement. The U.S. was reacting to pressure it was getting from
its domestic corporations. An example of this pressure was AT&T
which perceived that the sectoral annex for telecommunications would
result in a technology drain without a corresponding economic gain.28 3
Fin. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at 18, col. 1 and at 16, col. 1 (discussing Great Britain's plan to increase
telecom competition). However, unlike in the U.S., some of the biggest service industries in Europe,
like telecommunications, are owned or strongly regulated by the government. See Int'l Herald Trib-
une, Nov. 12, 1990, at 9, col. 2. Also, since the directives and regulations for the coming economic
integration of Europe in 1992 that will include the integration of banking and investment services are
still being worked out, it is uncertain just what the European market in services will require. See
Fin. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at 2, col. 8.
279. See eg., U.S.T.R., Statement of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Julius L Katz to the
Uruguay Round, July 24, 1990, at 3-4 (stating that agriculture is of critical importance to a success-
ful conclusion to the UR and that "linkages" between trade areas will make it possible to achieve a
total, ambitious package of agreements).
280. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
281. See Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 3, 1990, at 6, col 3.
282. J. de Gen6ve, Dec. 6, 1990, at 5, col. 4; U.S. Mission Daily Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1990, Geneva:
EUR 207.
283. See supra note 217.
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The U.S. continued this stance until Brussels, where it began to soften
and finally to concede that unconditional MFN ought to be written into
the services agreement. 2 Given the link that the developing exporters
made between open access in the agricultural and the service markets,
the U.S. service industry lobbyists had tremendous potential to hasten
the breakdown in agriculture.285
Why did the U.S. cling to a big agreement or bust philosophy, which
discouraged compromise that might have produced a modest agreement,
when faced with the very real possibility of achieving no agreement -
especially when several of the never-negotiated-before areas were difficult
to conceptualize let alone talk about in traditional trade terms? 286  The
U.S. Administration, fearing that a protectionist Congress might gut or
scuttle a modest UR farm liberalization result, bound itself to this philos-
ophy by law. With Congress passing the fast-track provision287 requiring
the President to present to it by March 1, 1991, a total package of results
from the UR in exchange for a Congressional hands off policy of no tink-
ering,2 88 the Administration bound its own hands by adopting a too am-
284. See Clairmonte, Debacle of the Uruguay Round: An Autopsy, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY at
2589 (November 24, 1990) (discussing that the process by which multinational corporations conduct
business and create markets is all about hiding behind a veil of forced liberalization while construct-
ing a wholly managed system of world trade that concentrates profit flow away from less developed
countries and predicting that this hypocrisy will be responsible for the failure of the Round).
285. See supra note 284.
286. For example, in the services area, conceptual difficulties arise in trying to define what the
entity to be traded is; what passing a boundary means when the exchange consists of electronic
impulses sent across fiber-optic wires or radio waves; and how ought the trade of information mea-
sured and quantified to ensure that an equivalent quantity of a different service, such as the con-
structing of a hotel, has been reciprocated between any two trading partners. Also, what if
quantifying comparable and equivalent amounts of reciprocated services is impossible, how are trad-
ing partners to know that they have been accorded the same most favored nation status in the
services areas as other members have. For a discussion of these conceptual difficulties see
UNCTAD, Services and the Development Process, TD/B1/1008/Rev. 1 at 5-13 (1985); BERNIER,
BINETrrE & GRENON, LABOUR MOBILITY AND TRADE IN SERVICES 19 (1988); FEKETEKUTY, IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS 31, 63,
87, 103, 135 (1988); Akehurst, The Economics of Servicer An Introduction, in THE ECONOMICS OF
SERVICES 1, 2 (G. Akehurst & J. Gadrey ed. 1987); ECONOMIST, GATE and Services, July 14, 1990,
at 72; Saxena & Bhat, Issues in Liberalization of Trade in Services: An Indian Position, 13 VORLD
COMPET oN L. & ECON. R. 75, 82 (1990).
287. Specifically, fast-track authority arises from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, 19 U.S.C § 2903(b) Application of Congressional "Fast Track" Procedures to Implement-
ing Bills.
288. Id. Fast track authority may be extended to implementing trade bills after May 31, 1991
and before June 1, 1993 if and only if the President requests such an extension of Congress in a
written report which, among other things, describes all the trade agreements to be implemented and
the U.S. Legislature has not voted to disapprove such an extension. Id. See supra note 287.
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bitious philosophy, and the special interest lobbies in services tied the
knots.
Besides their own behavior, the EC's intransigence and lack of
movement and the U.S.'s locking-into a total package or bust position,
the behavior of some of the developing country exporters precipitated the
impasse at Brussels by reinforcing the perception that the relative hege-
monic status of the U.S. and the EC had changed. From my observa-
tions, the most astute, assertive and active players among the less-
developed nations included India, Korea,2"9 Egypt, Hungary, Poland,
Mexico and the Latin American Four: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uru-
guay. Focusing on agriculture, this list whittles down to the Latin Amer-
ican Four.
Several pieces of evidence demonstrate that these countries perceive
themselves as having a heightened political status in the world commu-
nity. First is the "Young Turks" phenomenon underway in the govern-
ment bureaucracies of many Latin American countries including those
named above plus Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.290 Having been
trained in top universities in the U.S., a cadre of Latin American young
men have returned home to occupy positions of authority in their gov-
ernments. Because this cadre remains in touch with a few North Ameri-
can academic gurus, an established network center as well as a
networking process is constantly being affirmed and enhanced.291 The
new elites have similar views about the preferred pathway of economic
development and its timing. Not only are Latin American state
machineries populated by those with a free-trade world view, since the
new elites belong to the same ideological club as many North American
counterparts, they feel qualified to play the trade game in the same park
as the developed world.2 92
This perception of a heightened status of the Latin American Four
is supported by their representing and shaping the interests of the less-
developed world by their membership within the Cairns Group.2 93 The
289. Korea is generally regarded as newly-industrializing.
290. 10,000 Men of Harvard, NEWSWEEK (European Ed.), Dec. 10, 1990, at 42.
291. Id. at 44.
292. Id. at 45.
293. This is a North-South coalition of agricultural exporters including the developed, middle
powers of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the upper middle income countries of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Malaysia and Uruguay, the emerging market economy of Hungary, the lower middle
and low income countries of Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Classifications
are those of the World Bank. Higgott & Cooper, Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building:
1991]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Cairns Group has been a surprise in the international trading game.294
The diverse constitution and strong unity of the group has made it a
formidable third force in agriculture. Moreover, it exercised this force
intelligently, not by adopting policies that drove the EC and the U.S.
farther apart, but by offering initiatives that built confidence in the major
players' proposals.295
This conciliatory approach notwithstanding, most surprising was
the behavior of the Group during the last month of the UR. Spurred by
Brazilian and Argentinean anger and frustration over the lack of move-
ment by the EC, the Group began threatening to walk out of the agricul-
tural meetings and of the Round.296 The Cairns Group became
increasingly less a "middle way' 297 and more actively anti-EC,29s and
genuinely more activist in demanding farm trade liberalization.
Although sympathetic to the U.S. position, at the end of the Round, the
Cairns Group never joined the U.S. bandwagon nor became swallowed
up by the U.S.-EC maelstrom. The Group retained its own agenda for
opening up closed agricultural markets, for providing easier access for
less-developed countries, and maintaining its own timetable for liberali-
zation. Latin American countries may have already believed in their new
status in the world economy when they first joined the Cairns Group, but
Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 44 INT'L ORG. 589, 604
(1990).
The Cairns Group organized itself in the summer of 1986 just prior to the commencement of the
UR in response to the "1980s as a period in which they [had] been adversely affected by the growth
of illiberality in agricultural trade in general and the policies of the U.S. and the EC in particular."
Id.
294. Kahler & Odell, Developing Country Coalition-Building and International Trade Negotia-
tions, in RULES, POWER AND CREDIBILITY 115, 121 (J. Whalley ed. 1988). The surprise arises from
the fact that a manufacturing exporters coalition led by the newly-industrialized "Tigers" of Hong
Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan and including Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico, Brazil
and Costa Rica did not spring into being during the Round. Such a coalition could have easily
doubled as an agricultural exporters group with the addition of Uruguay and Argentina. Id. How-
ever, "Australia's willingness to provide creative and decisive leadership to stop the subsidy mad-
ness" was the key to the Group's creation and preservation. See Higgott & Cooper, supra note 293,
at 604-05, 612.
A surprise also arises from the fact that the economic diversity of the Cairns Group members has
not hindered its progress in becoming a force to be reckoned with in the agricultural meetings. Id. at
605. But, both the middle powers and the smaller exporters held the strong, communal perception
that the U.S. and the EC were victimizing "us all alike." Id.
295. Specifically, the Group has tried to come up with remedies that accommodate the EC
preoccupation with rebalancing as well as the U.S. preoccupation with tariffication. See Higgott &
Cooper, supra note 293, at 613.
296. J. de Gen6ve, Nov. 24-25, 1990, at 11, col. 1.
297. Higgott & Cooper, supra note 293, at 628.
298. J. de Gen~ve, Dec. 6, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
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their membership throughout the UR allowed them to act on that per-
ception and to work on increasing their political clout both within the
less-developed community and the world at large.
Since the Uruguay Round is still in limbo as of this writing, it can be
argued that even if the Latin American Four experienced a relative in-
crease in political clout due to the membership in the Cairns Group, with
the ending of the Round that clout will diminish. However, the real
strength of the Cairns Group does not lie in its being responsible for a
successful farm agreement, but rather it lies in the Group's ability to
move the U.S. out of its intransigence over 100% reduction of export
subsidies to formulate a very Cairns Group-style last proposal. The
strength of the Cairns Group and of the Latin American Four was their
ability to move the world a little further into a beyond hegemony2 99 trad-
ing park.
4.2 Ideological Factors
The ideology 3" of liberalized trade underpinning the GATT has al-
ways operated as a two-faced god, allowing members at one and the same
time to subscribe to the goals of open and transparent trade in order to
gain access to markets previously closed, as well as to preserve compara-
tive advantage by blocking export subsidies. Since the GATT began as
an almost private club for the developed world (and remained so until
the 1960s), major trading partners have created liberalized trade agree-
ments by offering bilateral trading concessions to their major suppliers or
with their major competitors, which is both a classic example of altruistic
behavior for selfish reasons, and a classic example of the give-to-get reci-
procity principle at work. These bilateral concessions would then be
made available to third party GATT members through the action of the
nondiscrimination (MFN) norm.
As the GATT membership grew to include a majority of less-devel-
oped nations, and as GATT interests expanded beyond the mere reduc-
tion of tariffs to include the whittling away of a variety of non-tariff
barriers on strongly protected trade areas, the give-to-get philosophy per-
sisted but changed in the 1970s to accommodate the needs of poorer
299. See generally KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLnTICAL ECONOMY (1984).
300. As used here the term ideology underpinning the GATT refers to a viewpoint about the
worth of GATT consisting of a set of expectations and observations about what trade liberalization
does for GATT members as well as a system of beliefs and values about how the market ought to
operate in order to achieve the goal of trade liberalization.
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GATT members who adopted the variant reciprocity norm of give-a-lit-
tle-to-get-more. With a relaxation of the taut balancing between what
less developed nations expected to give in terms of trading concessions
and those concessions they expected to get, regional associations prolifer-
ated in which some GATT members created enclaves of preferred trad-
ing that are for all practical purposes outside of the GATT.301
The give-to-get reciprocity norm did not work in the area of agricul-
tare during the Round. From the EC perspective, the U.S. offered only
ultimatums - no concessions. From the U.S. view, the EC offered noth-
ing. Given the lack of compromising spirit on either side, those "offers"
persisted through the Round until the end.
To understand why the reciprocity norm did not work in the area of
agriculture during the Round, it is necessary to look at the reason why
liberalizing farm trade was on the UR agenda.302 Agriculture is:
... peculiarly difficult to solve because social values and priorities confront
conflicts of economic interest. The essential dispute sets primary-product
producers, mostly in the Third World, against industrial agricultural inter-
ests-the factory farmers who dominate North American farmproduction,
and both of them against Europe's small-scale family farmers.
3
For decades, especially from the early 1960s, the major players had
buoyed up farmers with many kinds of financial support, especially ex-
port subsidies, in an attempt to make farming more productive, not nec-
essarily more efficient .3 ' This state policy of subsidizing farmers
ultimately backfired.305 Farmers produced more because they knew they
would be paid higher-than-market prices for their produce. However, in
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the world demand for farm produce
dropped,30 6 it meant that the prices of farm produce dropped and that,
301. See supra note 70.
302. See Fin. Times, Nov. 13, 1990, at 40, col. 1 (arguing that the ultimate objective of putting
agriculture on the UR agenda was to abolish farm subsidies and agricultural protectionism, which
was "an economist's dream" because "experience shows that governments faced with domestic or
international problems change their policies towards agriculture to suit their interpretation of the
situation at the time").
303. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 3-4, 1990, at 9, col. 1.
304. Interview with GATT Staff (Nov. 15, 1990). Hathaway, supra note 104, at 13-18.
305. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 16-17.
306. Id. at 17. "The growth in world agricultural output was interrupted by a massive land
retirement program in the U.S. and a drought there in 1983 that reduced yields on the fewer acres.
The U.S. output reduction was enough to cause the sharpest recorded decline in the IMF index of
food production since 1970." Id. But price increases were only modest and in 1985, the U.S. reinsti-
tuted direct export subsidies to farmers. But even so, U.S. support prices on products were lowered.
Id.
The plunge in world prices has created a trade crisis in agriculture. In countries that do not
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consequently, the subsidies and other kinds of farm support became akin
to a "paycheck" to keep farmers on the land and employed.30 7 Subsidies
became an entrenched insurance policy to prevent mass unemployment
in a sector, which would most probably result in large scale movement
into already burdened cities. Major subsidizers found themselves on an
export subsidy treadmill that would have required a scary leap into liber-
alization land to get off.
Liberalization of farm support has several effects, most of which are
painful, and this makes them scary as well. These effects differ depend-
ing on whether a country is exporting farm produce, and if so, if it is
subsidizing it, or whether a country is importing. If the major exporting
subsidizers, the U.S. and the EC, reduced their farm support, the short-
term effect would be that prices of previously subsidized products would
rise, often dramatically, within the domestic market. 38 EC liberalization
would increase prices in dairy, sugar, ruminant meat and wheat markets,
while U.S. liberalization would increase cereal prices.309 The likelihood
of finding a foreign market for those products diminishes if there are
other exporters who are able to deliver those same products to the world
market at a cheaper price; thus, trade volume would not greatly increase
with liberalization.310
The medium-range effects of liberalization are generally the most
frightening, both to the farmer and to the state. Without price supports
and export subsidies, inefficient farmers with a small profit margin who
experience a fall in the market are unable to earn a living at farming, go
bankrupt, join unemployment lines, often move to cities, and add to the
municipal and federal social services rolls.3 1' The state loses its compar-
ative advantage as an agricultural products exporter and experiences a
deficit in trade dollars. With higher food prices comes a slow but genu-
ine rise in the cost of living, as well as often unforeseen infrastructural
protect farm income by subsidy, the income of farmers has dropped sharply. And in those countries
that do protect farm income, the protection costs have skyrocketed. Id. For example, the CAP
costs the EC almost 60% of its annual budget. TIME (European Ed.), Nov. 5, 1990, at 22.
307. Interview with GATT Staff (Nov. 14, 1990). A member of the GATT staff working in the
Agricultural Division told me that the very small and inefficient French and German farmers were
little more than "civil servants" and ought to be recognized outright as such.
308. INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, BRINGING AGRI-
CULTURE IN THE GAIT: ASSESSING THE BENEFITS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 6-7 (1988) [here-
inafter ASSESSING BENEFITS].
309. Id.
310. Id. at 7.
311. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1578 (Nov. 14, 1990); Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 8-9,
1990, at 1, col. 3.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
changes. The long-term effects are generally more positive: food prices
stabilize, the domestic consumer eventually gets cheaper food and the
state, relieved of an enormous annual farm subsidy burden, can work to
improve its trade imbalance by creating a more favorable climate for
other areas of trade that are both unsubsidized and more productive than
farming. Most benefits would accrue to taxpayers and consumers.312
In developing farm exporting countries (that generally do not subsi-
dize) the effects of liberalization would generally be positive, even though
domestic prices would rise in response to developed countries'
liberalization.313
The benefits arise from the fact that most developing exporter coun-
tries generally have overvalued official exchange rates, and if these were
lowered as the developed countries liberalized their farm trade, then the
prices of food from developing exporters would be cheaper on the world
market.314 These countries would experience an increase in the volume
of trade. Again, consumers would be the ultimate beneficiaries of farm
trade liberalization. 315 However, "on balance, the net export earnings of
these developing countries would increase. '316
For farm products importers, liberalization would generally be bad
news for a considerable period as the market gradually rebounded:
"[t]he higher prices from liberalization would lead to a small reduction in
their real income [and] some countries are likely to face substantial short-
run adjustments with liberalization. ' 317 This is precisely why the devel-
oping importers' agricultural proposals during the UR requested special
treatment for liberalizing farm trade.3 s
This overview is admittedly simplistic, but it points to the dilemma
that the major subsidizing states face: what price farm trade liberaliza-
tion? And, what and how much support to give up in order to get how
much liberalized trade? On the one hand, subsidizing states would no
longer be paying huge sums of money to produce food;319 consumers
312. ASSESSING BENsFITs, supra note 308, at 10.
313. Goldin & Knudsen, The Implications of Agricultural Trade Liberalization for Developing
Countries, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 475-80 (OECD, Goldin & Knudsen ed. 1990).
314. Anderson & Tyers, How Developing Countries Could Gain from Agricultural Trade Liber-
alization in the Uruguay Round, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPING CoUNTRIEs 41, 44, 52-53 (OECD, Goldin & Knudsen ed. 1990).
315. Id. at 53.
316. ASSESSING BENEFITS, supra note 308, at 13.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
319. In 1989, the EC spent 10,000 million dollars on export subsidies, 20 times as much as the
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would eventually be paying their own bill for the food they consumed.
This price would reflect the rise and fall of the market, that is, the fair
price. Additionally, developing exporters would have a crack at the
world market in farm produce.32 On the other hand, developed nations
would face a painful lag period in which unwanted and unwelcome
changes befell the structure of their economy and society.
Fear of facing this painful lag in the area of farm support en-
couraged the U.S. and the EC to play "keep up with the Joneses" for
years, in order to beat out not only each other, but all other exporting
countries to the importing market. Ironically, during the UR some of
the developed countries who had heavily subsidized farm trade, notably
Sweden and New Zealand, 2' took the scary leap off the export subsidy
treadmill and experienced a painful landing. These countries felt com-
pelled to do so because their perception was that they eventually would
get much more than they gave. 2 2
The preferred GATT technique for promoting and insuring the reci-
procity of concession-making in previously non-negotiated trade areas
and preventing the cycle of export subsidies has been to strengthen
GATT safeguards against market disruption and dumping. 23 Specifi-
cally, to put more bite into Articles 18, 19, 23 and 28 of the Agreement,
as well as the Subsidies and Anti-Dumping codes.324 Strengthening these
safeguards was very much a part of the agenda of NGAgri 25 and very
much a priority of the Cairns Group developing exporters.326
Nonetheless, the reciprocity ideology backfired in the UR with re-
spect to agriculture. The EC perceived no get, only give (in other words,
no reciprocity) in any farm proposal of the exporting nations. The EC
saw only that it was giving up its comparative advantage as a food prod-
U.S.. Some agricultural products cost twice as much as they do in the U.S.. U.S. Mission Daily
Bulletin, Oct. 25, 1990, Geneva:EUR307.
320. See Fin. Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1, col. 2 (quoting the Argentinean farm minister, Felipe
Sola: "One of the principal causes of the international debt crisis was the 35 billion dollars a year
that developing countries had lost as a result of their diminished share of world farm exports since
1970.").
321. Interview with Delegate (Oct. 23, 1990).
322. That is, they perceived the long-term risk of not liberalizing their farm sector as far greater
because subsidization was dangerously draining their economy. Unfortunately, the experience of
such medium-sized countries neither persuades nor demonstrates the benefits of farm liberalization
to major player exporters with large revenues, large deficits and large trading volume.
323. TANGERMANN & MINER, NEGOTIATING STRONGER GATT RULES FOR AGRICULTURAL
TRADE 12 (1990).
324. See supra note 88.
325. Ministerial Declaration (Punta del Este Declaration), supra note 92.
326. Agra Eur., Oct. 19, 1990.
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ucts exporter-regardless of how false the basis of that advantage-as
well as giving up societal and infrastructural stability by plunging small,
inefficient farmers into insolvency. Perhaps the more ignominious sacri-
fice was that the EC would almost certainly lose a share of that advan-
tage to the U.S., its rival for hegemony in a decades-long subsidies war.
The EC perceived no real gain to all of this loss because without a
real consumer movement in Europe to lobby for lower food prices,
327
there was no social counterforce to the strong and visible farmers lobby.
Further, the EC saw no gain in losing its population of small farmers and
the rural areas of Europe.
It is understandable that Canadians, Americans, Australians and
Argentineans could devalue the gdal of preserving rural areas in Europe
because the cultural ethos of all of these countries arises from their wild,
wide open space. By contrast, in EC countries, rural areas are by no
means untamed, wide or open, but almost totally under human control,
often rolling hills are fenced or naturally partitioned. That the European
psyche may have needed to preserve what little wilderness still exists in
that environment helps to explain why the EC resisted intransigently,
and sometimes ferociously, to an ending of farm export subsidies.
Liberalization ideology is at heart a give-to-get ideology. It always
has the potential to backfire on trade negotiations if one or more of the
major players perceives itself as giving and not getting. To have avoided
an impasse, the U.S. and the Cairns Group could have offered to help
defray all or some of the EC farm export subsidies over a number of
years and to demand a concomitant phase-out of the subsidies over an
acceptable period. Using the give-to-get ideology in this way would have
been more diplomatic rather than legalistic, inasmuch as such a proposal
resembles a contract to liberalize farm trade by paying the EC to consent
to it. The advantages of this diplomatic-style proposal are its pragma-
tism and its high likelihood of success. This deal of subsidizing the subsi-
dies would have offered a considerable "gimme" to the EC. A
disadvantage of this proposal, however, is its implausibility, given the
U.S.-EC competition and the Cairns Group independence, the fact that
New Zealand had only recently removed its own export subsidies and
that the Latin American Four believed that no agreement was better
than a bad agreement.
327. Food consumers in Europe are generally resigned to relatively higher food prices for the
greater goal of preserving the rural countryside and the small farmer; or at least that's the image that
the EC Commission wants food consumers in Europe to believe about themselves in order to retain
the CAP. Cf. supra note 102.
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Another approach around impasse might have been to consider both
the negotiating posture of the major players as well as the altruistic/self-
ish dialectic inherent in any trade liberalization agreement. Elements of
a proposal directly acknowledging the EC's fear to leap from the subsidy
treadmill might have included a longer than ten year period for zero re-
duction of export subsidies; a series of big, irreversible changes in the
reduction of all farm support followed by periods of long rest during
which the effects of each big reduction would be monitored;328 a provi-
sion that would incorporate some limited flexibility into modifying the
tempo of liberalization, and very strong safeguard provisions that would
prevent the reintroduction of farm support. However, this proposal
would have the effect of creating a managed trade system for agriculture
similar to the MFA for textiles that might persist for some time longer
than the ten year phase-out desired by the U.S. and that, out of necessity,
may have to incorporate some elements of the CAP into the GATT.
Even though a managed trade system seems the most probable and work-
able approach, it is more than likely that the U.S., Canada and Argentina
would not be receptive to the idea.329
4.3 Organizational Factors
The way most members structure their delegations, as well as how
the GATT as an organization works to move negotiations along, have
also affected the outcome of the Brussels conference.330 The GATT staff
328. Specifically, it could be agreed upon to continue the negotiation process over a long period
by putting into the GATT an on-going mechanism for monitoring the level of support and protec-
tion, for notification of violations and for dispute resolution. TANGERMANN & MINER, supra note
323, at 15.
329. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 143. For a comprehensive set of policy recommendations on
what the negotiations ought to achieve in reducing import barriers and subsidies, see id. at 147-53.
330. For the most part, I did not observe directly the effects of organization of the negotiations.
This analysis relies mainly on inferences drawn from interviewing delegates about their experiences
with GATT staff influencing. However, observing how the GAIT staff played a critical but almost
invisible role in some GAT Council meetings, several NGServices meetings and a few NGAgri
meetings led me to ask some delegates about their observations and beliefs on the interaction be-
tween the GAIT staff and some of the major player delegations. Most delegates implied that the
GAT staff promoted the interests of some of the major players while downplaying those of others.
My sampling of delegates was small and not systematic. Latin America, the Cairns Group and
Europe were over represented. I spoke with lower-level delegates who either assisted or did most of
the negotiating on the floor and who generally did not have the decision-making power to change
their nation's position on the floor without consultation with higher-ups.
Also I interviewed some members of the GAIT staff, asking them to discuss the stafi's role in
influencing the negotiations. Again my sampling was small and not systematic. Staff confirmed that
influencing happened; they implied that it occurred only on an informal level and that its extent was
hard to measure. The staff seemed to take influencing as a fact of diplomatic life.
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exerts influence on those delegations who, by disagreeing from the
majoritarian position, prevent a consensus from forming. Staff influence
can take various forms and is most often adapted to the specific flow of
authority and the hierarchical structure of the dissenting delegation.331
Before I describe how the process of influencing works, I will briefly
discuss the role of the GATT staff in the negotiations. In every formal or
informal meeting of a negotiating group or a working party of that
group, GATT staff were present.332 Those staff seated at the Chairman's
table acted as the Chairman's secretaries, took notes of the proceedings
and, on occasion were largely responsible for drafting the Chairman's
texts that were disseminated to delegates to identify problem areas or to
summarize diverse positions. Often, these texts were used as the basis for
negotiating difficult issues in the final days of the Round.
In addition to the presence of the Chairman's secretaries, other
GATT staff, who I term floaters, also took notes. Floaters generally sat
in the chairs for observers situated along the walls and the back of the
conference room. Although their function is still unclear to me, floaters
were not usually from the corresponding GATT Division. It appeared to
me that floaters included GATT staff members from the Public Relations
Division responsible for producing the periodic publications, News of the
Uruguay Round, and the GATT Focus, which informed the diplomats
and the public about the progress of the talks. Floaters also included
staff from the upper echelon of the GATT Administration who probably
reported results of meetings in problematic negotiating areas, like agri-
culture and services, directly to the Administration.
Ostensibly, the GATT staff acted to influence the negotiations only
to move them along and to prevent impasse, which is always a possibility
because of the strong and unbending norm that negotiated agreements be
331. The delegates who discussed influencing with me, on the whole, agreed that most influence
was usually exerted on newly-industrializing and/or middle income developing countries whose del-
egates were considered competent and articulate and to whom people would listen.
332. I did not sit in on informal meetings, but at the formal meetings I attended, the Chairman
of the negotiating group always sat at a long table on a raised dais at one end of the room. Seated
with him at the table were his "secretaries," usually two members of the GATT staff. (For example,
for an NGServices meeting, the secretaries would be from the Services Division of the GATr.) It is
important to remember that these staff members are intelligent, well-educated and considered ex-
perts in their field. For example, it is not unusual for Chairman's secretaries to have advanced
degrees, to have done independent research and/or to have published in their area. Further, my
admittedly limited observations have led me to conclude that most GATT staff acting as Chairman's
secretaries were from the Anglo-Saxon world, with the preponderance from Great Britain, Ireland,
Australia, and New Zealand.
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achieved solely by consensus.333 Although approval by majority vote is
technically permitted,3 34 in practice all dissent must be dissolved by the
taking of political decisions. The burden lies on those delegations who
dissent from the majoritarian position (or who want specific language
inserted or a particular goal recognized in an agreement) to convince the
major players to take a political decision to strike a compromise. With-
out compromise, there is no consensus, and without consensus, there is
impasse.
The norm of consensus arises from the assumption that total agree-
ment forges the best compromise among all the differing views. Dissent
is preserved only in the record of the negotiations, which are not review-
able by the general public, and not expressed in the body of agreements
resulting from the negotiations. Consensus-making and dissent-dissolv-
ing assumes equivalent ability among all delegations to create and shape
opinion. This was not the reality I witnessed at the meetings I attended.
Ultimately, decision-making by consensus, with the ever present threat of
impasse, encourages the GATT staff to lobby delegates to change their
position. The interests of the major players33 1 provide the direction for
that change.
Influencing can work in several ways. The GATT staff influence the
trade talks indirectly by their text-drafting function. The Chairmans'
secretaries typically draft the informal memos of the Chairman, which
often review what has been discussed in the meetings, identify the sticky
issues and act as springboards for moving the negotiations along to con-
sensus. Also, the Chairmans' secretaries often write the working drafts
of formal agreements. Delegates I interviewed told me that they had
noticed on several occasions and in several different negotiation groups,
none of which was agriculture, that memos or working drafts presented a
biased view of all the positions taken, with the position of the major play-
ers being highlighted.336
The GATT staff influence negotiations directly in the following way.
By vocally dissenting on the negotiating floor, a negotiator may have ar-
gued forcefully, persuasively or persistently against the proposals or sug-
333. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
334. Voitovich, supra note 41, at 22.
335. A consensus of the delegates and staff I interviewed identifies major players as the U.S., the
EC, Canada, Japan and sometimes includes Switzerland, Sweden and the Nordics, Australia and
New Zealand. Often, the category of major player depends on the area under negotiation. There is
much overlap between the concept of Major Players and the OECD.




gestions of the major player(s). The GATT staff who act as Chairman's
secretaries will begin to lobby the delegate to change position under the
following conditions: when the negotiator is the center of a small and
vocal dissent that is clearly opposed to a large and adamant majority,
which creates a situation of no-movement in the negotiations; when, but
for an adamant one or two dissenters, a consensus in the negotiations
would be reached; or when the area under negotiation is complex, con-
taining many interlocking side issues, which all must be ironed out before
agreement.
If personal lobbying is not effective or if the staff has chosen not to
lobby the dissenting delegate(s), the staff can exploit the hierarchical au-
thority structure of trade delegations in several ways. First, the staff may
have the dissenting delegate excluded from the flow of information for
that negotiating group, which tells delegates about meeting schedules and
provides them with memos and working drafts. The paper flow may be
sent to another, often rival, delegate in the same delegation who is more
moderate or malleable. The new delegate, so encouraged, may begin to
attend meetings of the negotiating group. Further, the staff may contact
a higher-up in the delegation to lobby against the dissenting delegates's
behavior. As higher-ups are not as intimately involved in, or knowledge-
able about, the issues of the day-to-day negotiations as the dissenting
delegate, and because the GATT staff are generally perceived as neutral,
often the higher-up may yield to pressure and request the dissenting dele-
gate to have a change of heart. Sometimes, when the stakes are high, the
staff contacts the highest levels of authority in the delegation or may seek
contact with the Trade Minister at the country's capital.
All delegates who spoke to me about the staff influencing empha-
sized that the staff played favorites and that their influencing was also for
the interests of the major players. Most of these delegates were not from
countries that the staff favored so their experience with staff influencing
was they had felt pressured to change their position in order not to be
considered obstructionist.
Since this description of influencing did not come from the negotia-
tions on agriculture, but from those on services, dispute resolution and
anti-dumping, where major and minor players crossed each other, and
because only major players (the Cairns Group is viewed as a third major
power) clashed in the agricultural negotiations, I have no information
about how the GATT staff influencing directly affected the impasse in
agriculture. Nevertheless it is valuable to discuss in general terms how
staff influencing might have affected the overall process of negotiation
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during the UP. First, there is a widespread perception that the GATT
staff is neutral, which comports with general expectations about the be-
havior of other international organizations, especially of the UN Secreta-
riat. If this perception of neutrality is not accurate, as some delegates
have indicated, then delegates should be advised of staff biases in order to
better comprehend and withstand all the political pressures upon them
that mold their position.
Second, probably what the GATT staff has been doing all along has
been stacking the deck for the major players because proposals from
them may have been the most liberalizing. If it helps to move negotia-
tions through difficult periods by influencing delegates and if that influ-
ence is generally effective in producing long-term liberalization, then by
openly acknowledging its influencing role, the GATT staff frees itself to
lobby for whichever interest seems most likely to liberalize trade. How-
ever, as world politics and trade flows change, the major players have
become increasingly more protectionistic.337 In order to meet its goal of
advancing trade liberalization, the GATT staff needs to go with the flow
of political power shifts and may have to support proposals that run
counter to the interests of major players.
3 3 1
Third, the GATT staff is comprised of experts, generally econo-
mists, who do or facilitate research on world trade.339 This research is
valuable and considerable, but often self-serving in that it promotes the
GATT as an institution of paramount importance for making trade open
and transparent. The view expressed in such research is that without the
GATT, there can and will be no major trade liberalization efforts. Be-
cause of its expertise, the GATT staff can expect that its influence will
carry much weight. Further, much of GATT research, imbued with the
view that the U.S. and the EC act as the economic hegemonies, encour-
ages and reinforces diplomatic behavior that grants special status to the
offers and aims of these two players in trade negotiations.
Although its research and goals communicate a perspective that
337. See supra note 67.
338. Of course, the assumption here is that trade liberalization is really what the GATT staff is
after. If one believes that the goal of trade liberalization is a myth and that the real function of trade
agreements is to preserve the economic and political status quo-which many believe underlies the
realpolitik of multinational corporations who effectively put trading concessions into practice (see
Clairmonte, supra note 284), then GATT staff influencing is just plain lobbying for majoritarian
interests.
339. Especially when there are no trade rounds in progress, the GAIT resembles a research
institute where staff compile statistics, construct hypotheses and deduce theorems about a wide
range of trade topics.
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may be a function of a past political reality, the GATT staff should
openly express this perspective. Many delegates of the less developed
countries were overwhelmed by the complexity of the issues in several of
the new negotiating areas, particularly services, intellectual property
(TRIPS) and investment measures (TRIMS), whereas many of the major
players brought in experts from private industry who helped them for-
mulate proposals and provided them with information. Where such gaps
of understanding and information exist among negotiators of different
delegations, the GATT staff should not fill in those gaps in such a way
that excludes or precludes dissent and disagreement. It should be shar-
ing its expertise and advice as well as revealing its biases and world view
in order to make transparent its influence and its direction over the
negotiations.
This suggestion may seem sacrilegious given the strong sentiment
that secretariats of international organizations should be conduits, not
casters, of opinion, but trade negotiations are too important and affect
too many billions of lives to be played out in an underhanded manner.340
Besides, an open playing field is what GATT purports to be all about,
and openly revealing, rather than reviling, the influencing of the GATT
staff gives all delegates better command over the real rules of the game.
5.0 SIGNIFICANCE
Two interrelated key points surface in examining the events of the
Uruguay Round and the impasse at Brussels. First, instead of dying, the
GATT may emerge as a stronger treaty if it recognizes and incorporates
some fundamental truths about the nature of all trade treaties. Second,
an impasse in a heavily-subsidized area that precipitated a breakdown of
the Round came as no surprise.
A fundamental truth about the nature of all trade treaties is that
practical, workable and lasting trade treaties necessarily balance the al-
truistic motive of free trade and nondiscrimination with the selfish reality
of national interest. No trade treaty or organization, not even the ITO,
functions in a wholly altruistic way to give all members the same trading
benefits through the action of nondiscrimination (MFN) alone.
Although GATT members say they want the GATT to function in just
340. Whether the factory where a Malaysian sleeve-sewer does piece work gets a contract from
an American clothing manufacturer, thereby enabling her to work for the next two weeks, or what a
Vancouver school child will pay at lunchtime for her Swiss yogurt, or what a Chilean farmer gets for
his winter wheat, all represent in miniature how pervasive the effect of trade negotiations is on all of
US.
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that way, members behave differently, in ways that will allow them to
capture or to protect an advantage in the marketplace. Members protect
their trading interests by erecting barriers against the access of their do-
mestic markets or by getting other members to remove their own barri-
ers. Until there is world free trade with no barriers of any kind, every
trade treaty will have to balance the altruistic motive to liberalize trade
with the selfish practice to protect comparative advantage, and to balance
the drive towards nondiscrimination among all trading partners with the
need for reciprocity between trading competitors.
The process of liberalizing trade is not only about creating millions
and billions of dollars in increased revenue. It is also about shifting the
advantage in the trade of a commodity when the protection comes off,
and is therefore a pleasure-pain game. Ignoring the fact that the GAIT
must balance these counteracting interests has resulted in an inefficient
form of treaty, with extra Tokyo Round Codes that do not function in
the same way for all members, and an inequitable process of organization
with the hidden influences of the GATT staff and agreement by consen-
sus that lop off dissent.
Although it is true that the impasse in the Uruguay Round high-
lights all the inefficiency and inequity in the GATT, the impasse does not
necessarily presage its demise, but may point the way to needed change.
Given the U.S. push for big, quick liberalization and the EC pull for tiny,
slow liberalization and their general unwillingness to compromise, it was
foreseeable that the agricultural negotiations would not achieve an agree-
ment. Ultimately, the general sticking point was that GATT members
wanted to achieve farm trade liberalization subject to GATT norms and
disciplines. For example, GAT members at Punta del Este could have
decided to create an agricultural agreement separate from the total pack-
age, as they had done for services, or they could have decided to go
outside of the GAT entirely to create an agricultural agreement remi-
niscent of the Multi-Fibre Agreement for textiles trade. Either option
would have done away with the possibility that failure to agree in agri-
culture would take the Round down. By choosing to negotiate agricul-
ture in the Round using GATT rules, members took on the risk of
impasse.
Agricultural trade is not easily negotiated because it is full of those
nontariff barriers that are the most trade distorting and market protec-
tionistic. Reducing and removing those kinds of barriers creates eco-
nomic disequilibrium and other deep change. Thus, liberalizing farm
trade under the GAIT requires the ultimate reality-testing about what
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the GATr is, does and strives for. It requires the recognition and ac-
ceptance that the GAIT is all about making trade agreements in areas
that are heavily protected by nontariff barriers that are primarily recipro-
cal and secondarily nondiscriminatory. Specifically, liberalizing farm
trade in the Uruguay Round will require making an acceptable agree-
ment that confronts the sticking points of the necessary reduction of ex-
port subsidies and the dismantling of the variable levy in ways that are
perceived reciprocal by the U.S. and the EC. It will require considering
all the reasons for farm liberalization, not just the economic benefits to
some exporting nations, but also the gain and loss in political prestige in
the major players, the increase in unemployment of EC farmers and the
perceived need by the U.S. to liberalize quickly.
The lesson of the Uruguay Round impasse in agriculture is that be-
cause liberalizing farm trade under the GATT will have painful and un-
certain effects, it must be done slowly, mindfully and flexibly. The
GAIT as a treaty and as an organization must change to recognize itself
as a creator of trade agreements that must always juggle the goals of
reciprocity and nondiscrimination.
LORETrA F. SMITH
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